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Among the several macroeconomic policies used by governments in their pursuit 
of their nations' economic objectives is monetary policy. This dissertation is a study in the 
controllability of the monetary base, the principal tool in the execution of monetary policy. 
Though much of the literature and discussion of the base has taken place in the 
context of developed countries, especially the United States, the ideas developed in that 
literature have been discussed and assumed to be relevant for less developed countries. 
This dissertation does not address the broader issue of the role of monetary policy in 
development, or the appropriate monetary aggregate, or the relevant proximate monetary 
indicator. Rather the central concern of this dissertation is the issue of the controllability 
of the base in less developed countries relative to the US. 
The current framework for monetary policy has an integral part the contemporary 
money supply paradigm (Steindl 1982), an early version of which appeared in Meade 
(1935). The paradigm holds that the quantity of money (currency plus deposits) equals 
the product of a money multiplier and the monetary base: 
M=mB (1.1) 
The above identity suggests that the ability of a monetary authorities to control the 
money supply depends on the ability to change the monetary base and influence the money 
multiplier. It is common to see t~e assumption that the money multiplier is constant. 
Therefore when the monetary authorities want to change policy, they need only to deal 
with the monetary base. 
I 
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The problem of how to control the money supply is part of the general problem of 
regulation and control. The most systematic studies of alternative modus operandi of 
regulation have been the 'tariffs versus quotas' debate in international trade theory and the 
arguments about how to control a country's pollution. Basically there are three alternative 
methods of restricting the production or consumption of a good. The first is to increase 
its price. The second is to ration it (i.e., impose a quantity control). The third is to reduce 
the efficiency of those who produce it. Outside the monetary field, the principle analysis 
of such instruments has been of non-tariff barriers to trade. However, the basic analysis of 
the application of such restrictions to banks in the form of reserve requirements is well 
developed. Could all three methods of control be applied to the problem of monetary 
control. Thus one increase the cost of holding money, ration it, or reduce the efficiency of 
those who holding it (banks). 
Moner is both an asset (to the holder) and a liability (of a bank or government). It 
is possible to analyze control by regarding money as either an asset or a liability, hence the 
multiplicity of techniques. Any method of controlling the money supply necessarily 
involves interference with the process of money creation. The authorities seek to change 
the behavior of actors in the process of money creation so as to either induce them to 
create more or less money than they would otherwise do. Thus understanding the process 
of money creation is necessary for the analysis of the techniques of monetary control. 
The simplest case of money creation is that in an economy where currency is 
issued by the monetary authorities, the government, is the only form of money. In this 
case (called closed economy) the crucial point is that money is created when and only 
when currency is put into circulation. So in this simple economy any government 
spending, including the purchase of assets, would necessarily create money, i.e., increase 
the money supply, as would any purchase of government obligations like bonds etc. The 
process described needs to be expanded to include a description of the creation of bank 
deposits, the other form of money in most communities. Bank deposits are an asset to 
3 
their holders but are also a liability of the banks. Thus the creation of bank liability must 
involve the creation of bank assets. In this simple economy, there are several methods that 
could be suggested to control the money supply: Price effects and quantity effects on 
deposits; Price effects and quantity effects on bank lending; Price effects and quantity 
effects on private lending to public sector; Price effects and quantity effects on private 
lending to private sector. 
In the open economy, the balance of payments may be either a target or a 
constraint of government economic policy. This may have implications for the 
government's preferred level of monetary growth. The authorities may wish or be forced 
to pursue a strict monetary policy to reduce a balance of payments deficit. Basically a 
balance of payments surplus increases (and deficit reduces) the money supply. This may 
lead to a conflict of objectives in official policy. It also adds a number of additional 
techniques of control to those mentioned above. Moreover the link between domestic 
credit expansion and the exchange rate should be considered. 
Two different ways exists when considering the case of an open economy. The 
first from the fact that governments normally purchase and sell foreign currency in order 
to manage the foreign exchange rate, and to provide their citizens with foreign currency to 
purchase goods, take holidays abroad etc. Any such acquisition ( or sell) will have exactly 
the same impact on the money supply as when the government buys or sells any other 
asset. These include government borrowing in foreign currency from any source including 
the IMF. 
Also in an open economy, the impact works through the banking system. 
Foreigners may hold deposits with or borrow from native banks. One might choose to 
treat the foreigners as part of the non-bank private sector and so include their deposits in 
the money supply. One need not take note of the difference between a loan to a resident 
or to a non-resident; the impact of both on the money supply is identical. This simple 
internationalist viewpoint is not normally adopted, however, because it ignores the 
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political reality that transactions with foreigners are regarded as different; if only because 
balance of payments statistics are relevant to macroeconomic policy. Transactions 
between residents and foreigners which are settled by means of checks drawn on domestic 
banks will affect the money supply. 
The second aspect of money creation involving an open economy is that a loan to a 
foreigner creates a deposit. This deposit may be held by a resident or by a non-resident. 
Hence loans to non-residents may increase the money supply but need not_ necessarily do 
so. This uncertainty can be resolved and the impact of deposit transfers incorporated by 
looking at net bank claims on foreigners (loans to foreigners less foreign-held deposits). If 
these rise, the money supply increases, and if net claims fall, the money supply reduced. 
In this open economy, there are several methods that could be suggested to 
control the money supply: 
a. Price effect on the openness impact. This method of monetary control could be used to 
induce transactions by foreigners which will cause the money supply to fall. Such 
transactions nearly appear on the debit side of the balance of payments. Thus this 
technique is to deliberately 'worsen' the balance of payments by some means or other so as 
to reduce monetary growth or vice versa. A capital outflow in some form or other is the 
likeliest way of achieving this in the short run. 
b. Quantity effects on the openness impact. 'Quantity effects' here means some from 
exchange control designed to prevent an inflow or an outflow. Conventional exchange 
control that prevents outflows means that money supply is higher than it otherwise would 
be. Exchange controls have to be enforceable to be of any use, and many commentators 
have been sceptical of their possible efficiency. 
1.1 Why is Money to be Controlled? 
Some methods of controlling the money supply have been mentioned, and there 
are many variants of each so the total number of methods is large. As the authorities can 
combine any number of techniques of control into regimes of monetary policy, there are a 
very large number of possible regimes of control. With this on hand, why is money to be 
controlled? It is a standard feature of economics that the answer to any question is 'it 
depends on the objectives.' But in some cases the method of control may negate the 
principal or a secondary objective of monetary policy. For example, some governments 
have switched to monetary policy to avoid frequent changes of fiscal policy, or because 
spending and taxation cannot easily be changed, as in Italy and the USA. In general, the 
means must be consistent with the end. Moreover, the techniques should not interfere 
with whatever objectives governments may have, such as efficiency and income 
distribution. 
1.2 Over What Period is Money to be Controlled? 
Some schools of economics wish to maintain a stable rate of monetary growth. 
Others wish to vary it from year to year, like the US Federal Reserve system, under 
Chairman Volcker. Some authorities do not mind large fluctuations away from targets 
over the short run~ others do. 
5 
1.3 The Monetary base 
The relevant issue here is whether the central bank, in implementing monetary 
policy, can exercise a high degree of control over its policy instruments. Since the 
monetary base is the most important determinant of the quantity of money, and there is a 
high degree of association between those two, and the monetary base is determined not 
only by the domestic variables but also by the position of the balance of payments of the 
country, the relevant issue concerning the money supply control, then, is whether the 
foreign components of the monetary base can be offset by the actions of the central bank 
using domestic components. 
1.4 Statement of the Problem 
In less developed countries could the monetary authorities adjust the monetary 
base, and if they could, would they be able to control the growth of their money stock 
with a reasonable degree of accuracy? So the fundamental question of interest is: 
Can the monetary authorities in less developed countries control the monetary base 
sufficiently, so that they can control their money stock growth? 
This study emphasizes the problem of the foreign exchange flows in open developing 
economies, and its impact on the domestic economies. 
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1.5 The Objectives of the Study 
The study attempts to investigate the ability of the monetary authorities in less 
developed countries to control the monetary base and therefore to affect growth of the 
money supply. In the process the following issues are addressed: 
1. What are the components of the base in an open economy? 
2. Which components change, and how much do they change? 
3. Which of these changes are desired by the monetary authorities? 
4. Which of these changes do they have to accommodate because of non-monetary 
reasons? 
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Because of the tendency of governments in LDC to use the central bank for 
development financing, those issues are of considerable importance. And after 
investigating them, would we be able to tell whether or not a central bank can pursue 
monetary policy according to the traditional view? So after defining the main determinants 
of the monetary base and then examining them in some LDCs to find their Central Bank's 
ability to sterilize the impact of the foreign reserve flow, would they be able to control the 
growth of money stock with a reasonable degree of accuracy? 
For controlling base-money the monetary authority must offset the movements in 
the uncontrolled components through changes in the controlled component. If the Central 
Bank is to maintain control of the monetary base for pursuit of domestic goals, the impact 
of foreign reserves on the base-money must be sterilized by using sterilization policy 
instruments, things that will be investigated in the study, along with the ability of the 
monetary authorities in LDC to sterilize the impact of an outflow or inflow of foreign 
reserve on the monetary base because of the payment imbalances in these countries. 
Since the supply of the monetary base in LDC is determined by the reaction of the 
Central Banks to those pressures that mainly come from the fiscal (government) and 
foreign sectors, the relevant issue concerning the money supply control, then, is whether 
the foreign (endogenous) components of the base can be offset by the actions of the 
central bank using domestic components. 
In the distinction between developed and developing countries, one important 
point is to be highlighted here. The main difference in the sources of the base-money is 
that in developed countries the major component of base money is claims on government 
(i.e. government securities), whereas in developing countries net foreign assets are the 
major component. This point is in effect part of this study. 
Chapter two surveys the literature of the monetary base, followed by a distinction 
between the base as an analytical concept and the controllability of the base for ultimate 
macro-goals; then the controllability of the base to control monetary aggregate is 
discussed 
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Chapter three provides the constructions of the base, along with a survey on the 
consolidated balance sheets of the monetary authorities, commercial banks, and monetary 
system. After which, the way the base is calculated in seven different countries described. 
Chapter four handles specific monetary features ofLDCs. The effectiveness of 
different techniques depends considerably upon the structure of the economy. For 
example, the wider the range of financial institutions, the harder it is to make direct 
controls operate, and the less effective the base to be utilized. It shows how the sharp 
differences in the basic structure of the base exist between developed and developing 
economies. 
Chapter five discussed the fundamental issue of the theoretical foundation for 
feedback effects. The transmission mechanism from the balance of payments to the money 
supply, and vice versa, and the role of autonomous expansion and the balance of payments 
are explored. These issues along with the international monetarism and the creation of 
money and credit are presented. The technique chose for controllability of the base must 
not be such as to interfere with the transmission mechanism appropriate to the economy 
concerned. If the monetary policy influences behavior through credit availability, then the 
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implications are clear-similarly if the mechanism is through interest rates. The means must 
not be self contradictory. 
The relationships between the components of the monetary base are empirically 
tested in chapter six. It includes different kinds of statistical tests such as the stationarity 
tests on both the levels and the first differences that validate my findings. The 
cointegration test has been implemented. along with the causality test, the results neatly 
presented with discussions. Finally in chapter VII summary and conclusions that explored 
whether or not the monetary base could be controlled or not in seven different countries. 
CHAPTER II 
THE BASE 
The concept of the monetary base has a long history. It has particular appeal to 
those economists who have pushed for limiting monetary expansion to promote price 
stability. Proponents of the quantity theory of money, the classical long-run neutrality of 
money, and rational expectations have all tended to give prominence to the notion of a 
long-run anchor for the price level. Many of them have supported the use of the monetary 
base in that role. Other analyses have focused on more narrowly technical issues 
associated with using the base in one or another of its potential roles. 
2.1 The History of the Name 
Several names have been applied to what is now most often called the monetary 
base. For instance, Burgess (1936, 5-8), Friedman (1959), and Lothian (1976, 56-68) 
have named it "high-powered money." Gurley and Shaw (1960) introduced the term 
"outside money." They named it based on the idea that "outside money" is an obligation of 
the government (including the central bank) that is outside the private sector. In contrast, 
"inside money" is an obligation of the private sector. 
These names of the monetary base reflect its role in the policy discussions. The 
monetary base consists of things that function as reserves of the banking system and are 
obligations of the government or the central bank. In terms of controlling the base, 
economists have argued that it should be feasible to control the base because: 
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• many of its components are in the Federal Reserve's balance sheet 
-
• the base's behavior has the potential to affect broader monetary and economic 
variables, because of regulatory and behavioral linkages between the monetary base 
and various monetary aggregates that have been proposed as an intermediate target. 
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As long as currency is provided on demand, it is not directly controllable. Control 
would have to be achieved indirectly by influencing demand for money. So the monetary 
authorities can succeed if they use the base as an intermediate indicator rather than 
targeting it to be able to control the growth of nominal economic activity, such as real 
interest rates and reserves. 
2.2 The Definition of the Monetary Base 
The base concept can be developed from either the sources' side or the uses' side 
of the balance sheet of a central bank. This creates a number of possible approaches to 
define the monetary base. Two widely definitions are available, one of which is prepared 
by the Board of Governors and the other by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. 
The Board of Governors (1988) approached the construction of the monetary base 
in terms of its uses. They describe the base before adjustment for reserve requirement 
changes as: 
• total reserves, 
• required clearing balances and adjustments to compensate for float at Federal 
Reserve Banks, 
• the currency component of the money stock less the amount of thrift institutions' 
vault cash holding normally included in the currency component of the money stock, 
and 
• the excess of current vault cash over the amount applied to satisfy current reserve 
requirements at institutions not having required reserve balances. 
The second approach defined the monetary base has been presented by the St. 
-
Louis staff, for instant, Gibert (1980, 3-10; 1984, 27-3; 1987, 24-29); Haslag and Hein 
(1988, 1-17; 1989, 1-15); and Hafer, Haslag, and Hein (1991, 1-23), in which the 
construction of the base conceptually from the source's side. It describes the base as: 
• Federal Reserve credit-holdings of securities in the portfolio, 
• loans by the discount window, 
• gold stock, 
• Special Drawing rights, 
• Treasury curr~ncy, and 
• other balance sheet items. 
Several categories of liabilities are subtracted, namely: 
• Treasury and foreign deposits at the Federal Reserve, 
• Treasury holdings of currency, and 
• certain miscellaneous items. 
When they actually construct what they call the source base, they define it as 
currency in the hands of the public plus required reserves plus excess reserves. In other 
words, they define the base in terms of its uses, although they treat vault cash 
contemporaneously rather than in lagged form. 
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Gilbert (1980, 1984, 1987) presented a detailed description of the techniques of 
reserve adjustment, from which it could be seen that for years since 1980, the RAM has 
set the reserve ratio on transactions' deposits equal to 12 percent, the marginal reserve 
requirement on such deposits. The actual average reserve ratio has recently been about 8 
percent because there are zero and 3 percent reserve limits. The RAM measure assumes a 
zero reserve requirement for other types of deposits, even though some of them are 
actually subject to a 3 percent ratio. For years before 1980, the ratio was equal to 
member bank deposits and only applies the ratio to such deposits, separate ratios for time 
and savings deposits was applied. 
13 
Haslag and Hein (1989, 1990) and Hafer, Haslag, and Hein (1991) suggested that 
-
it makes an important difference if the base is adjusted for reserve requirement changes. 
However, the different techniques of adjusting for reserve ratios are oflimited importance 
over most time periods. The St. Louis base measure is larger than the Board measure 
since it uses a higher reserve ratio, and it thus gives more weight to deposits relative to 
currency. The movements of the bases often differ. However, the differences in rates of 
growth are generally slight for periods of a quarter or more. 
2.3 The Logic of Using the Base 
Using the monetary base to control the monetary aggregate or to achieve a 
national goal was questioned by many economists. Benjamin Friedman ( 1988) was one of 
those who commented on these policies. His criticism is that a large portion of the 
monetary base consists of currency, and the demand for currency is not well understood. 
In the meantime by considering the underground economy, some currency is used for 
illegal transactions that are not captured by GNP statistics. A portion is used for 
transactions in countries where the local currency is not stable or is not freely convertible. 
In terms of the components of the base, should deposits be considered "money," or 
should money be defined to consist only of gold and other government obligations? Irving 
Fisher ( 1911) and other economists argued persuasively that deposits performed 
essentially the same payments and account services as currency and coin. Therefore 
ignoring them would lead to a serious understatement of existing monetary services. The 
subject was mostly left to rest until 1970s. 
Lothian ( 1976) presented a justification for a narrow money measure such as the 
monetary base or currency. He argued that all financial assets provided a mix ofmoney-
and bond-type services. Currency and non-interest-bearing reserves have little 
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opportunity to provide bond-type services. Deposits, on the other hand, may pay interest 
-
either explicitly or implicitly, and the institutions accepting them may offer bond-type 
services to deposits. In an environment with variable regulations and inflation, the mix of 
money-and bond-type services provided by deposits may vary more than the mix provided 
by the non-interest-bearing monetary base. Consequently, Lothian concluded that the base 
was likely to be a better proxy for monetary services when deposit characteristics differed 
overtime. 
Different roles have been proposed for the monetary base in order to determine its 
contributions, and its nature within the components of a central bank balance sheet. After 
overlapping the conceptual and technical sides of the monetary base in an effort to figure 
out these roles, the issues that have been questioned are: 
• whether the monetary base can be exogenously determined, and 
• whether estimated relationships between the base and intermediate or ultimate policy 
goals would be sustained if appropriate efforts were made to control the base. 
2.4 The Monetary Base as an Analytical Concept 
Randolph Burgess (1936, 5-8) an officer at the New York Federal Reserve's open 
market desk in the 1920s and 1930s, described in 1936 what then seemed to be a common 
view of the monetary base, which he called high-powered money. He explains this idea by 
presenting the image that there are in any country two kinds of money, and for the sake of 
giving them names they may be called high-powered money and low-powered money. 
The central bank deals in high-powered money, the money that constitutes bank reserves. 
Then he adds that historically, this high-powered money has been closely related to a 
country's basic reserves of gold and currency, though the specific form of this relationship 
shows wide variations under different banking laws. He added that when the amount of 
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high-powered money increases, the amount of low-powered money tends to increase also, 
but in multiple relation to the high-powered money. 
Burgess presented high- and low-powered money as analytical concepts to help 
explain how the purchase or sale of gold or securities would lead to growth or shrinkage 
of commercial bank deposits. Provision of high-powered money by the central bank 
makes it possible for the banks to create more low-powered money according to what has 
now become familiar as the money multiplier models. 
Karl Brunner, and Allen Meltzer (1964, 240-283) defined the nominal money 
supply as a product of the money multiplier and the monetary base in the following 
identity: 
M=mB 
where M: nominal money supply (currency plus demand deposits), 
m: money multiplier, 
B: monetary base. 
The above identity suggests that the ability of monetary authorities to control the 
money supply depends on the ability to change both the monetary base and the money 
multiplier. The money multiplier can be a useful device if the underlying behavioral 
characteristics serve to make its ratios' stable, then the relating central bank actions will 
successfully affect the behavior of money. In that case, a change in the monetary base 
would be associated with a proportional change in money. Alternatively, money and the 
monetary base will not move closely together if the multiplier is not stable, i.e., if any one 
of its component ratios shifts frequently. Many economists over the years have expressed 
unease over the implicit weighting scheme that gives relatively heavy weight to currency, 
because they believe that the behavior of deposits has a major role in influencing activity. 
Nonetheless, during long stretches of time, the multiplier's ratios have been sufficiently 
stable so that many analysts have downplayed the worries about the low weight given to 
deposits. 
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2.5 The Controllability of the Base for Ultimate Macro-Goals 
Targeting the monetary base itself in place of the traditional monetary aggregate in 
order to resolve the possible short-run control problems associated with such monetary 
aggregate, or to treating the monetary base itself as a narrow monetary aggregate to 
achieve national goals, has been prop~sed by many economists, and is the main point to be 
explored in this part. 
The idea that the monetary base could be considered a monetary aggregate 
developed gradually. Lothian (1976) found that the monetary base showed a more 
consistent relationship with net national product than did a broad monetary aggregate. He 
posited that differential interest rates, inflation, and regulations such as interest rate ceiling 
and reserve requirements had a larger influence on the demand for deposits than they did 
on the demand for non-interest-bearing central bank monetary assets. 
2.5.1 GNP and the Base 
Some authors have substituted the monetary base for M 1 or M2 in targeting the 
nominal income, generally GNP. Anderson and Jordan from St. Louis Federal Reserve 
developed that type of model in the late 1960s, and updated and modified it in subsequent 
years. Studies in the late 1970s and early 1980s compared the models' performance when 
the monetary base was used as the monetary aggregate with the models' performance 
when Ml was aggregate. The models were estimated with data covering the previous 
twenty to thirty years. The models generally achieved better fits for Ml than for the 
monetary base. 
Anderson and Kamosky (1977, 2-7) used a simplified version of the St. Louis 
equation. They estimated their model from 1952 to 1961, using quarterly data, and then 
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extended it year by year through 1975. They used the estimated model to simulate the 
next four quarters, GNP. They found that in the equations using Ml, the errors had 
modestly lower variance than the errors in the equations using the monetary base. 
However, the equations using the monetary base achieved lower mean errors and mean 
absolute errors. The authors concluded that it would be worthwhile to consider using the 
monetary base as an intermediate target because its forecasting performance was only 
slightly worse than Ml, and it was easier to control. 
Many other economists attempted to test the notion that the monetary base might 
have a role to play in the determination of GNP better than Ml or M2. Their work has 
been summarized in table 2.1 below. 
Table 2.1 







1961 to 1978 
1959 to 1969, 
extended to 
1973 then 1979 
1953 to 1978 
A significantly better fit for M 1 than for the 
base. The limited relationship between the 
base and GNP derived from currency 
component, not total reserve component. 
He shows much less of a gap between Ml 
and the base, if judged by the values for 
adjusted R2 
The.base explained larger portions of the 
variation in GNP than it did in Davis' 
studies. He observed a sizable differential 






Board of Governors 
Staff 
(1988) 









1960 to 1980 
1988 
1961 to 1979 
extended 
1980 to 1988 
1961 to 1980 
extended to 198 7 
1981 to 1989 
1980s 
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He achieved better overall results, because 
additional variables were included. He found 
that Ml showed only a slightly better fit 
than using the monetary base 
A differential in the performance of MI and 
the monetary base, but generally weaker 
relationships to GNP. 
The estimates using the monetary base were 
considerably poorer than those for Ml, MI-
A, or M2. The simulation for the next period 
show large errors for all measures, and bias 
monetary base 
Over initial sample period, their results were 
similar to the others. Extending the period 
weakened the explanatory power but greatly 
reduced the differences among monetary 
measures and showed considerable 
deterioration with respect to both Ml and 
the monetary base. 
He offers updated versions of some of his 
earlier equations. He achieves the same 
ordering as Stone and Thornton, with the 
base improving and Ml deteriorating 
relative to the earlier period. 
They performed a slightly different exercise 
and reached a similar conclusion. They 
found that the base had the smallest standard 
deviation of MI, M2, although the 
differences among them were not dramatic. 
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2.5.2 Prices and the Base 
Different studies have been presented to examine the impact of the choices of 
monetary variables ( the monetary base, M 1, and M2) on the rate of change in prices. All 
of these studies only examined the relationships through the 1970s. Compared with the 
GNP studies presented before, over the sample periods the monetary base did relatively 
better. 
Hafer (1984, 85-93) in his equation that he used for GNP, he substitutes the rate 
of change in prices for GNP and included longer lags than his GNP equation. He 
observed a stronger relationship between the monetary variables and prices than between 
the monetary variables and GNP. 
Fama (1982, 201-231) used a different approach from the others. He chose 
sample period from 1954 to 1976 with annual data at first then quarterly or monthly data. 
Inflation was expressed as a function of the monetary variable and nominal interest rates. 
He used current money and money lagged one period. He concluded that the monetary 
base was superior to Ml as a monetary measure. Hence, he concluded that the monetary 
base was the appropriate monetary variable to foilow to achieve a price goal. 
2.6 The Controllability of the Base to Control Monetary Aggregate 
The monetary base would be controlled not for its own sake but in order to 
achieve the desired behavior of another variable, usually a monetary aggregate. Milton 
Friedman (1959) proposed targeting a monetary aggregate and suggested that 
manipulating high-powered money might be a reasonably effective way to attain the 
monetary targets. Karl Brunner and Allen Meltzer (1968) made a similar proposal and 
explored several aspects of the multiplier relationship. 
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Karl Brunner (1968) in his study "The Role of Money and Monetary Policy" found 
-
that the movements of federal credit dominated movements of other sources, and 
therefore determined most movements on the base. In the United States, 70 percent of the 
supply of the base consists of federal reserve bank credit to the government in the form of 
US. government securities purchasing. Therefore, in the US the money base is 
substantially under the control of Fed assuming some form of the Fed independence. 
Anderson and Jordan (1968a, 1968b) and Burger, Kalish, and Babb (1971) 
developed in some detail the suggestion to target the monetary base. They presented 
multiplier relationships between the monetary base and Ml. Rasche and Johannes (1987) 
presented a variety of multipliers they computed to make separate allowances for 
transactions' deposits and time deposits. They built an elaborate multiplier model that has 
been regularly updated for Shadow Open Market Committee meeting. Those economists 
promoting the control of the monetary base recognized the problems associated with 
differential weights given to currency and deposits, they doubted that these difficulties 
would prove to be serious on practice. 
Those economists believed that the presence of binding required reserve ratios 
would make the ratio of reserves to deposits relatively stable as long as adjustments were 
made whenever the Federal Reserve changed the specified ratios. They expected payment 
conventions and the absence of banking crises to provide stability to the ratio of currency 
to deposits. Empirical analysis of the data covering the 1950s and 1960s generally gave 
some support to their expectation. Burger, Kalish, and Babb (1971) recommended a 
control procedure in which the monetary base would be targeted to achieve desired 
growth in Ml. They proposed estimating the multiplier from recent behavior of its 
constituent ratios. Then they compared their model forecasts of the multiplier with the 
actual values of the multipliers. They found the errors to be small in size and observed 
that they were not cumulative. They concluded that if the proposed monetary base targets 
were achieved and the multipliers were the same as those that actually occurred, then 
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money growth would have deviated only slightly from a: smooth path. From these results, 
-
they argued that following their procedures would produce a reduction in unwanted 
variation in money growth. 
Balbach (1981, 3-12) supported a similar proposal, arguing that the central bank 
could control the monetary base since the base consisted of items on the central bank's 
balance sheet that could be observed with at most a one-day lag. He and Burger, Kalish, 
and Babb (1971) did not contemplate a limitation of Federal Reserve issuance of currency, 
but instead advocated offsetting undesired movements with increases in or restrictions on 
the provision of total reserves through open market operations. The Federal Reserve 
would have precise knowledge of the amount of currency it had issued, and therefore 
would know the size of offsetting adjustments in reserves needed as soon as any unwanted 
currency movements took place. 
Meulendyke ( 1990, 28-31) on the other hand, did not support the proposal of 
controlling the monetary base, suggesting that the consequences of trying to control the 
base would be undesirable because the observed multiplier relationships on which such 
proposals were based are estimated when the monetary base was determined 
endogenously, and in practice the process is not so simple. Technically, the Federal 
Reserve cannot, through use of open market operations, achieve desired nonborrowed 
reserve levels with precision because there are a number of factors on its balance sheet, 
such as Treasury cash and Federal Reserve float, that it does not control and can only 
observe after the fact. 
As an example she added, if the Federal Reserve attempted to control the base by 
offsetting undesired expansion of currency through a reduction in nonborrowed reserves, 
depository institutions might borrow at the discount window to obtain the reserves lost, 
lifting total reserves back to the level where they stood before the reduction in 
nonborrowed reserves occurred. Consequently, it would not be possible to control the 
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monetary base even though it would be possible to control what is often referred to as the 
-
nonborrowed base, which is the monetary base minus borrowed reserves. 
In supporting the argument against controlling the base to achieve a certain level 
of monetary aggregate she added, if total reserve component of the monetary base target 
is achieved, a decline in nonborrowed reserves cannot be offset by an increase in borrowed 
reserves. A reduction in nonborrowed reserves can only result in an equal decline in total 
reserves if the lower level of nonborrowed reserves is consistent with existing demands for 
reserves to meet requirements, because excess reserves are larger than depository 
institutions desire, or if depository institutions adjust loans and deposits and reduce to 
reduce required reserves by the full amount of the reduction in nonborrowed reserves. In 
order to lower required reserves, deposits would have to fall by a multiple of the desired 
decline Whether such sharp adjustments to deposits over a short time period are feasible 
has been debated. 
McCallum (1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c) focused on the base as an operating 
target, presenting an exception from those proposals concerning the monetary base since 
the early 1980s who have focused on the uses of the base as an intermediate target rather 
than an operating target. He has been influenced by the breakdown of .the relationship 
between Ml and GNP in the 1980s. He suggested two modifications to the common 
monetary targeting proposal. First, he suggested that nominal GNP could serve as an 
intermediate target as long as it was chosen to insure that inflation would not be high. 
Second, he advocated an adaptive policy rule that contained the means for the procedure 
to recover when underlying relationships between the base and GNP shifted as a result of 
deregulation or other developments. He suggested that the monetary base could serve as 
the operating instrument, thereby arguing that the base be controlled directly on a day-to-
day basis, although he only advocated a quarterly average growth target. McCallum did 
not discuss his assertion that the monetary base could be controlled. His equation for 
quarterly target growth of the monetary base consists of three terms. The first is a 
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constant, equivalent to the desired trend growth in nominal GNP. The second term 
subtracts from the constant the average increase in monetary base velocity over the 
previous four years. This term introduces a gradual response to changes in monetary base 
velocity so that the model will adapt to changing trends. The third term provides for a 
partial response to deviations of GNP from its constant growth target. McCallum 
recommended a 25 percent per quarter adjustment factor in response to such deviations. 
These relationships he presented in equation form as: 
* bt - bt-1 = 0.00739 - (l/16)[xt-l - Xt-17 - bt-1 + bt-171 + .25 (x t-1 - Xt-1), 
where b is the log of monetary base and x is the log of GNP. An asterisk indicates a target 
value. 
Thornton (1982, 22-39) discussed the argument regarding lowering required 
reserves. In order to lower required reserves, deposits would have to fall by a multiple of 
the desired decline. Whether such sharp adjustments to deposits over a short time period 
are feasible or not has been his extensive debate. Those favoring short-run controls of the 
base generally argued that depository institutions could make quick adjustments to 
deposits if they were given the incentive to do so. In a parallel fashion, they believe that 
the depository institutions would respond to a shortage of nonborrowed reserves by 
contracting loans and deposits until required reserves had shrunk to the point that they 
were consistent with existing supplies of nonborrowed reserves. 
The appropriate time period over which it was desirable to achieve control of the 
monetary base is the debate that took more attention of many economists. Very short-run 
control of the monetary base was never advocated for its own sake. Instead, it was seen 
as a mean to achieve a desired path for money and in turn for economic activity and 
prices. Thornton (1982), generally a supporter of monetary base targeting, recognized 
that very short-term control was not feasible because loan and investment decisions, under 
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any reserve accounting scheme, would not be closely linked with current reserve levels. 
-
Thus the adjustment would not occur instantly. He did not think that the delays would be 
a problem because banks would adjust over meaningful periods. His arguments on this 
point are not typical of the literature supporting base targeting. 
Thornton and many of the supporters of a monetary base approach to money 
control argued for short-run targets for two reasons: 
1. they were afraid that if deviations were permitted, the central bank would allow misses 
of sufficient duration to affect adversely economic activity and prices. 
2. they believed close control was feasible at low cost. 
Their critics had a range of views with regard to the first point but disagreed with the 
second. Many of the operational and stability concerns associated with monetary base 
targeting would be reduced if the time period for achieving the target was lengthened 
beyond the single reserve maintenance period cited in most of the control proposals. The 
conclusion with this regard is that the monetary base could be controlled with only modest 
errors over a one-to-two-quarter horizon if nonborrowed reserves were manipulated to 
bring the monetary base bake on track once evidence developed that it was deviating 
significantly from a desired path. 
Meulendyke (1990) presented the question, whether the monetary base can be 
controlled in a way that does not introduce short-run instability to interest rates and 
money demand, and cited the difficulty to answer that question without actual empirical 
work. Nonetheless, the longer the control horizon, the more likely the answer will be that 
control of the base without unacceptable instability in rates and money demand is indeed 
possible. 
Anther impediment to monetary base control was the way the discount window 
functioned. Many of the supporters of base control suggested that the discount window 
be closed or that the discount rate be set high enough to ensure that borrowing would be 
costly. The later option would not make the monetary base precisely controllable, since 
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banks still could borrow reserves in excess of those consistent with the target, but the high 
cost of doing so would discourage borrowing and make the monetary base approximately 
obtainable. The severe restrictions on borrowing would be presumed to limit deviations 
between the monetary base and the nonborrowed base. 
CHAPTER Ill 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BASE 
In less developed economies, the central bank and government policies are 
considered synonymous, and the central bank is an essential arm of the government's 
overall policy objectives. In short, the central bank acts as a director and executor of the 
government's financial and monetary policy in developing economies. However, the 
monetary analyses of developed economies, especially in the US after 1950, customarily 
treat the behavior of central banks as being an exogenous, independent influence on the 
monetary conditions. So the central banks in developed economies are the autonomous 
initiator, director and executor of the monetary policy. 
The International Monetary Fund (1984, 22) defines the term "central bank" as the 
single financial institution that most closely resembles the functionally defined monetary 
authorities. Despite country differences, there is rarely any doubt which financial 
institution should be regarded as the central bank. If the central bank performs all the 
functions of the monetary authorities, the financial assets and liabilities will be recorded in 
its balance sheet. This balance sheet will provide the basic statistics necessary for the 
compilation of the monetary authorities' accounts and will be presented followed by 
deposit money banks' accounts, monetary survey' accounts, and the monetary system, the 
monetary base and the way it could be calculated in seven different countries will be after. 
For the purpose of international comparability the definitions and the tables will be 
consolidated to the criteria used by the International Financial Statistics. 
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3.1 Monetary Authorities 
The monetary authorities perform a variety of functions. Th_ey issue notes and 
coins that circulate freely as a recognized mean of payments. As the holder of the 
economy's international reserves the monetary authorities stand ready to accept, or 
provide, foreign currencies in exchange for their own currencies as needed for balance of 
payments' purposes, or to make adjustments to the exchange rate for the national 
currency. Their supervision of the financial system requires the monetary authorities to 
determine the appropriate levels of liquidity, for domestic economy as well as for banks, 
and to influence the development of financial institutions' assets and liabilities accordingly. 
As the principal financial agent of the central government, the monetary authorities are 
called upon to validate the government's transactions both by providing credits, and by 
absorbing the surplus funds of the government. 
In many countries a central bank has sole responsibility for all such functions. In 
other cases some of these functions are either or entirely carried out by central 
government or by other official institutions. In a few instances it is difficult to distinguish 
any central banking account within the government's accounts, either because of monetary 
policy is an integral part of overall government policy or because a country adopts a 
monetary policy stance that obviates the need for a resident monetary authority. It may 
permit the currency issue of another country's monetary authorities to serve as the local 
medium of exchange. 
Given the variety of institutional arrangements existing throughout the world, it is 
necessary for purposes of international comparability that the data on the monetary 
authorities' accounts include all financial assets and liabilities ascribed to the performance 
of the above-mentioned monetary authorities' functions. The financial institutions are 
assumed to have, within the government regulations that may govern their activities, the 
freedom to determine the kinds of financial transactions in which they engage, the 
segments of the financial market in which they operate as sellers and buyers of financial 
instruments, and hence the kinds of liabilities that they incur and the financial assets that 
they acquire. 
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A summary of the monetary authorities' accounts that are related to the 
performance of monetary authority type functions in a typical country is shown in the table 
3.1 below. 
Table: 3.1 Monetary Authorities: Detailed Account 
Foreign Assets 
Claims On Government 
a. Central Government 
b. State And Local Government 
Claims On Nonfinancial Public Enterprises (Public Sector) 
Claims On Private Sector 
Claims On Deposit Money Banks 
Commercial banks 
Other monetary institutions 
Claims On Nonmonetary Financial Institutions 





Of Which: Currency Outside Banks 
Time, Saving, And Foreign Currency Deposit 
State and local government 
Nonflnancial public enterprises 
Bonds 
Foreign Liabilities 
Long-Term Foreign Liabilities 
Government Deposits 
Counterpart Funds 
Government Lending Fw1ds 
Capital Accounts 
Other Items (Net) 
Unclassified liabilities 
Less: Unclassified assets 
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3.2 Deposit Money Banks 
(Banking System) 
30 
Deposit money banks comprise all banks and similar financial institutions that have 
appreciable liabilities in the form of deposits transferable by check or otherwise usable in 
making payments. This functional definition emphasizes the role of deposit money banks 
as the principal creators of deposit money for the economy through their extensions of 
credit to nonmonetary sectors. 
The definition is functional rather than institutional, because institutional 
terminology varies greatly and the same terms may sometimes refer to what might 
appropriately be classified as deposit money banks in one country and nonmonetary 
financial institutions in another. Moreover, the functional characteristics of financial 
institutions may change overtime while the institutional terms that denote them remain 
unchanged and vice-versa. For example, saving banks have traditionally relied mainly on 
time and saving deposits placed with them by small savers, which they have in tum 
invested in a narrow range of financial instruments, notably government securities and 
mortgages. In many countries, however, such banks have expanded their financial 
activities to include the acceptance of demand deposits on a scale sufficient to qualify 
them as deposit money banks. The IFS regarded such financial institutions as deposit 
money banks once they have appreciable liabilities in the form of transferable deposits. 
Deposit money banks' accounts that include their assets and liabilities presented in 
table 3.2. On the asset side, the primary distinction is between the foreign (nonresident) 
sector and the domestic (resident) sector. The domestic sector is subdivided into central 
government, the nonmonetary financial sector, and the rest of the domestic economy. The 
rest of the domestic economy further subcategorized into public sector and private sector. 
The public sector further broken down into the rest of general government and 
nonfinancial public enterprises. 
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On the liabilities' side, the distinction between sectors is generally less detailed in 
that only central government deposits and foreign liabilities are shown separately, and 
banks' liabilities to other domestic sectors distinguish only between demand deposits and 
time deposits. In some countries, special liabilities such as long-term foreign liabilities and 
counterpart funds shown separately as a source of banks' lending funds. 
Table: 3.2 Deposit Money Banks: Detailed Account 
Reserves 
Currency 
Deposits with central bank 
Foreign assets 
Claims On Government 
a. Central Governments 
b. State and Local Government 
Claims On Nonfinancial Public Enterprises (Public Sector) 
Claims on Private Sector 
Claims On Nomnonetary Financial Institutions 
Others 
Demand Deposits 
Time, Saving, And Foreign Currency Deposits 
Money Market Instruments 
Bonds 
Foreign Liabilities 
Long-Term Foreign Liabilities 
Government Deposits 
Counterpart Funds 
Government Lending Funds 
Credit From Central Bank 




Less: Unclassified assets 
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3.3 The Monetary Survey 
To identify factors responsible for the changes in the money supply, an accounting 
framework for a money-creation sector of the economy in a typical country is set up. We 
can see from the tables 3.1, and 3.2 above that by netting out the items appearing on the 
asset side and the liability side of the elements of the consolidated balance sheets of the 
monetary authorities and deposit money banks, we will be left with a picture of 
relationships existing between monetary sector and the rest of the economy. 
The consolidation of the accounts of the monetary authorities (as derived in Table 
3.1) and the deposit money banks (as derived in Table 3.2) is used to derive the monetary 
survey account. The details are shown in Table 3.3. The major aggregates on the assets' 
side are foreign asset and domestic credit, while those on the liabilities' side are money and 
quasi-money. Foreign assets are defined as the sum of the foreign assets of the monetary 
authorities and those of the deposit money banks less the foreign liabilities of these 
institutions. Domestic credit is the sum of claims on central government and claims on 
other domestic sectors. The domestic sectors have been breakdown into claims on state 
and local governments, claims on nonfinancial public enterprises, claims on private sector, 
and claims on nonmonetary financial institutions. 
Table: 3.3 Monetary Survey: Detailed Account 
Foreign Assets 
Foreign assets (MA) 
Less: Foreign liabilities (MA) 
Foreign assets (DMB) 
Less: Foreign liabilities (DMB) 
Domestic Credit 
Claims On Central Government (net) 
Claims on central government (MA) 
Less: Central government deposits (MA) 
Claims on central government (DMB) 
Less: Central government deposits (DMB) 
Claims On State And Local Governments 
Claims on state and local governments (MA) 
Claims on state and local governments (DMB) 
Claims On Nonfinancial Public Enterprises 
Claims on nonfinancial public enterprises (MA) 
Claims on nonfinancial public enterprises (DMB) 
Claims On Private Sector 
Claims on private sector (MA) 
Claims on private sector (DMB) 
Claims On Nonmonetary Financial Institutions 
Claims on nonmonetary financial institutions (MA) 
Claims on nonmonetary financial institutions (DMB) 
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(Table: 3.3 concluded) Monetary Survey: Detailed Account 
Money 
Currency outside banks (MA) 
Private sector deposits (MA) 
Other public sector deposits (MA) 
Nonmonetary financial institutions' deposits (MA) 
Demand deposits (DMB) 
Quasi-Money 
Time, savings, and foreign currency deposits (MA) 
Time, savings, and foreign currency deposits (DMB) 
Bonds And Money Market Instruments 
Bonds (MA) 
Money market instruments (DMB) 
Bonds(DMB) 
Long-Term Foreign Liabilities 
Long-term foreign liabilities (MA) 
Long-term foreign liabilities (DMB) 
Counterpart Funds 
Counterpart funds (MA) 
Counterpart funds (DMB) 
Government Lending Funds 
Government lending funds (MA) 
Government lending funds (DMB) 
Other Items (Net) 
Other items (net) (MA) 
Capital accounts (MA) 
Deposit money banks' cash (MA) 
Deposit money banks' deposits (MA) 
Less: Reserves (DMB) 
Other items (net) (DMB) 
Credit from central bank (DMB) 
Less: Claims on deposit's money banks (MA) 
Liabilities to nonmonetary financial institutions (DMB) 
Capital accounts (DMB) 
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3.4 The Monetary System 
So far, we have clarified the financial position of the monetary authorities and 
deposit money banks followed by the monetary survey, this helps us to observe their 
position in the money supply process. It is possible now to form a consolidated balance 
sheet for the monetary system netting out the items appearing on the asset side of 
consolidated balance sheets of the monetary authorities and the commercial banks, this 
will left us with a picture of relationships existing between the monetary sector as whole 
and the rest of the economy. 
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Through the elimination of all inter-bank transactions in the consolidations, the 
balance sheet of the monetary authorities will be condensed and looks like the one in table 
(3.4.A) below. However, the balance sheet for the deposit money banks will be like the 
one in table (3.4.B) 











Currency held by Public 
















Time and Saving Deposits 
Foreign Currency deposits 
Government Deposits 




Utilizing the information in the two condensed balance sheets above in tables 
(3.4.A) and (3.4.B), and after abstracting the details, looking for the essence, one can get 
a condensed balance sheet for the monetary system as a whole, which is table (3. 4. C) 
below. Table (3.4.C) gives us a clear picture of how the money supply component 
formalized, where table (3.4.A) gives a clear picture of the formalization of the monetary 
base. 





Net Foreign Assets 
Money Supply: 





The information in table (3.4.C) may be written as the following identity: 
Total Assets= Monetary Liabilities+ Non-monetary Liabilities (3.1) 
where 
• Total Assets (Net Foreign Assets+ Domestic Credits) 
• Monetary Liabilities (Money Supply= Currency "held by public"+ Demand Deposits) 
• Non-monetary Liabilities (Quasi Money and Other Liabilities). 
By rearranging the above identity we obtain: 
Monetary Liabilities = Total Assets - Non-monetary Liabilities (3.2) 
Therefore, the narrow definition of the money supply is equal to the total assets of 
the monetary system minus the non-monetary liabilities. The monetary importance of the 
foreign assets and domestic credits is thus clearly demonstrated through the asset side of 
the monetary system. The above identity underlies the statements of the money supply 
and its determinants. In fact, it is one of the bases of the discussion of the LDC money 
supply process. 
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3.5 The Monetary Base 
As an integral part with the identity (3.2) above, and as it appeared in the 
contemporary money supply paradigm (Steindl 1982), the current framework of the 
money supply holds that the quantity of money (currency plus deposits) equals the product 
of a money multiplier and the monetary base: 
(3.3) 
The identity suggests that the ability of a monetary authorities to control money 
supply depends on the ability to change both the monetary base and influence the money 
multiplier. If we assume a constant money multiplier the monetary authorities will be left 
to deal only with the monetary base to change policy. One of the exceptions is Weintraub 
(1967, 257-270) where he has found that in the United States, the Fed.'s ability to change 
the base in order to affect the money supply is reduced because of the corresponding 
changes in the money multiplier due to the operations. 
In fact, the base may be regarded in either of two algebraically equivalent ways, 
the source base and the use base. The factors, from the assets and liabilities of the 
monetary authorities balance sheet table 3. 1, that make the base available are called 
"sources." And the forms in which the base is held ( currency in the hand of non-
govemment, non-bank public, and commercial bank reserves), are referred to as "uses." 
Both the sources and the uses are derived from the consolidated balance sheet of 
the monetary authorities' table 3 .1. The sources are a supply of monetary base provided 
by monetary authorities, and the uses are demand by public and commercial banks. A 
computation of the base from the source side indicates the capability of any monetary 
authorities to control over their base. In the United States, 70 percent of the supply of the 
base consists of Federal Reserve Bank Credit to the government in the form of US 
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government securities purchasing. Therefor, the US supply of the base is substantially 
-
under the control ofthe Fed. Brunner (1968, 8-24) has found that the movements of Fed 
credits dominate most movements on the base. In a small open economy foreign assets 
and foreign liabilities are very important variables affecting the sources of the monetary 
base, and play a significant role in its behavior. This difference generates the corner stone 
between developed and developing economies and to be investigated theoretically in 
chapter 5, and empirically in chapter 6. 
3.6 Calculating the Base 
In an open economy, the monetary base is determined not only by the domestic 
variables but also by the position of the balance of payments of the country. So the 
relevant issue concerning the calculation of the base is to find its foreign components as 
well as its domestic components. 
Table (3.5) Notation: 
Capital accounts CA 
Claims on deposit money banks CCB 
Claims on government CG 
Claims on official entities CPS 
Claims on other financial institutions CO2 
Claims on private sector COI 
Counterpart funds CF 
Currency held by public CP 
Demand for base Bd 
Deposit money banks reserves CBR 
Foreign assets , FA 
Foreign currency and other deposits FCOD 
Foreign liabilities FL 
Government deposits GD 
Import deposits ID 
Long-term foreign borrowings LTFB 
Other items 01 
Other Sources OS 
Source base BS 
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The monetary base relates to components belong to its sources, from which it is 
called the source base (BS). These components have been presented in table (3. I) above 
(the monetary authorities consolidated balance sheet), and could be presented algebraically 
to give us the typical source base equation in a typical country as: 
Bs = FA+ CG+ CPS +COI + CCB + CO2 
- FCOD - ID - FL - L TFB - GD - CF - CA - 01 (3.4) 
Those components can be netted so that: 
I. Net Foreign Assets (NFA), that is foreign assets (FA) minus foreign liabilities (FL) 
minus long-term foreign borrowing (LTFB), 
2. Government Account (GA), a discrepancy between claims on government (CG) and 
government deposits (GD), 
3. Commercial Banks advances, that are claims on commercial banks (CCB), 
4. Public Sector advances, that is claims on public sector (CPS), and 
5. Other Sources (OS), which the net of [COI, CO2, FCOD, ID, CF, CA, 01] 
And algebraically these significant components, could be summarized, and represented 
again to give us another typical source base equation in a typical country as: 
Bs = NFA +GA+ CPS+ COI + CCB + CO2 
- FCOD - ID - CF - CA - 01 
This gives 
Bs = NF A+ GA+ CCB + CPS + OS 
(3.5) 
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A careful look at these components of the base shows that the net foreign asset 
(NF A) reflects the position of a country's balance of payments, which is not under control 
of the central bank. Variations of credit from a central bank to the government, in some 
countries especially LDC, are also not under the bank's control, because a central bank 
adjusts passively to the government's budget position. Thus, NF A and GA are essentially 
uncontrolled components, and the monetary authorities are left to the rest of the 
components in equation (3.5) which is claims on commercial banks (CCB) claims on 
public sectors (CPS) and other sources (OS), through which monetary authorities try to 
control the base. So the source base equation could be written as: 
Bs = Uncontrolled + Controlled (3.6) 
Where 
Uncontrolled = NF A + GA (3.7) 
Control = CPS + CCB + OS (3.8) 
We, therefore, can conclude that the controllability of the monetary base in a 
typical country depends primarily on the degree to which the movements of the central 
bank credits are offset·by opposite changes in the uncontrolled components. If 
movements of central bank credits are offset to a large degree, there is a little base control. 
Which in turn can say that controlling the base to either the monetary aggregate or to 
achieve some macroeconomic goals are unattainable. This topic has been investigated 
empirically in seven different countries and presented in chapter six. 
We have just discussed the "sources" side of the base. On the "uses" side, demand 
for the base (Bd) comes from the public and commercial banks. The base is used by the 
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public as currency (CP), and by commercial banks as reserves. Currency in circulation is 
divided into two parts, one part is held by the public and the other part is held by 
commercial banks as vault cash. The later, together with commercial bank deposits at the 
central banks, constitutes commercial banks' reserves (CBR). So the demand for base 
could be presented algebraically to give us the typical demand base equation in a typical 
country as: 
Bd = CP+CBR (3.9) 
Assuming the money multiplier, min identity (3.3) is predictable, the most 
important relationship in determining the quantity of money supply is the equilibrium 




The monetary base is in equilibrium only when its supply (BS), provided by the 
monetary authorities, equals the demand for the base by public (CP) and by commercial 
banks (CBR). If the disequilibrium exists, the supply and demand for the base are not 
equal, the balance sheet adjustments by commercial banks cause money supply to change. 
The components of the base in my sample countries are summarized and presented 
in the next table 3.6, from which I was able to derive the source base equation for each 
country that has been presented after in table 3. 7. 
Table: (3.6) 
The Components of the Base in Seven Different Countries 
• • • • 
• • • • • • • • 
• • • 
1111111111:. • • • • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • • 
• • 
• Indicates that the component exists 






1966.09 - 1991.06 
1957.01 - 1991.08 
1960.01 - 1991.09 
UAE United Arab Emirates 1975.01 - 1991.09 
USA United States 1957.01 - 1991.09 
• • 
• • • 







• • • 








The Monetary Base Equations for Seven Different Countries 
• 
• · B"=FA+CG+CCB+C02-FL-GD-OI (3.12) 
(3.13) 




•. B"'=FA+CG-FL-GD-0! (3.18) 
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Although the basic framework of analysis of the money supply is similar in all 
economies, the money supply process itself is highly differentiated depending on variety of 
factors, such as the openness of the economy or the system of trade and payments. 
Equation (3.4) presented the typical source base equation in a typical country, where 
equations (3.12) through (3.18) represent the source base in seven different countries, the 
reason for these differences is going to be explored with details in the coming chapter. 
For now, careful look to these equations, one can figure out the importance of foreign 
assets and foreign liabilities and their role in supplying the base. Beside this openness, we 
have to consider how each country maintains their system of trade and payments. Some 
of these payments' systems have been under a fixed exchange rate, where their domestic 
currency pegged to only one other foreign currency, or to a basket of currencies. Since 
1971 the world has moved to floating exchange rate. The variability of exchange rates has 
necessitated a modification of monetary economics, and seemed more and more urgent to 
economists since that time. 
CHAPTER IV 
SPECIFIC MONETARY FEATURES 
OF LESS DEVELOPED ECONOMIES 
4.1 Introduction 
Discussing aspects of the limitations in the monetary sector in LDCs makes the 
comparative investigation of the monetary base clearer. Specifically, in these LDCs a 
significant deviation in the creation of the monetary base structure is inherited from 
unadjusted process of a previous period. For example, the creation of a large amount of 
monetary base close to the end of any period under consideration, may be carried over to 
the next period. The lower efficiency of financial organizations generated by a lower level 
of economic development, should be considered as a direct influence on the monetary base 
creation process. 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7, the components of the base in seven different countries, show 
significant dispersion of the creation of monetary base in different economies. These 
differences usually were oversimplified to make a role applicable to many of the 
differentiated economic structures in institutional economic systems and economic 
development levels. 
It is known that the main characteristic that distinguishes a modem from a 
primitive economy is that a modem economy is a monetary one, where transactions either 
involve the use of money or are expressed in monetary units, as when credit is extended. 
So the use of money as a medium of exchange is the major institutional datum of 
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developed Western economies. These economies are not barter economies, nor do they 
have large subsistence agricultural sectors. 
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The problem of monetization exists in LDC. In these countries monetary sector 
coexists with a subsistence or traditional (non-monetary) sector within the domestic 
economy. Monetization, defined as the enlargement of the sphere of the monetary 
economy, involves the extension through time and space of the use of money in all aspects 
( medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value) to the non-monetized sector. With 
economic growth, it is reasonable to expect that the proportion of the non-monetary 
sector to the monetary sector will decline. 
Hla Myint ( 1971) describes the financial markets in a modem or monetized sector 
as composed of: (I) the organized money markets, and (2) the unorganized money 
markets. The first consists of institutional agencies of credit: central banks, commercial 
banks, and financial intermediaries (insurance companies and long-term lending institutions 
in urban areas, and various cooperative credit societies in rural areas). This market is 
quite sophisticated to the extent that one expects the speculative demand for money to 
vary with interest rates. 
The unorganized money market, which is not homogeneous is made up largely of 
indigenous banks, money lenders, traders, landlords, and commission agents, some of 
whom combine money lending with trade and other activates. In those markets, while 
interest rates are expected to change with the risks and return on real assets, the supply of 
money may not affect interest rates significantly. The participants of this market are 
largely outside the direct control of central bank. 
In many LDC, it is important to point out that the unorganized money market still 
dominates a significant sector of the money market, chiefly because of its presence in the 
agriculture sector. Attempts are being made to promote integration of the two types of 
markets. The policy objective of the central bank in these countries is for the organized 
money market to bring the unorganized sector within its fold. 
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The theory of money has not been fully explored in the LDC. Most 
decentralization is only possible because of the existence of money; so non-monetary 
economies, which are highly authoritarian in LDC, made their study difficult. It is not 
easy to determine exactly either the components of the money or the monetary base or 
what money does in many developing economies and still less to explain why this peculiar 
institution has arisen. Some studies that attempted to study the money in LDC focused 
their attention to different task than mine, like money and interest rates or money and 
inflation rates, but still studying them is helpful in terms of given a general explanation to 
the money market in LDC. Those studies could be summarized as: 
Subrata Ghatak ( 1981, 26) argued that in many LDC, the interest rate is 
administrated by the central bank rather than market-determined in the organized sector. 
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the interaction between the demand 
for and the supply of money could determine the interest rate. For this reason, 
investigators observe the expected rate of inflation, rather than the interest rate, as a major 
variable in influencing the demand for money in LDC (Deaver 1970, 9-27; Campbell 1970, 
341-386; Wong 1977, 59-86; and Balino 1983, 279-298). In particular, in those countries 
that have experienced a hyperinflation, it has been shown that the demand for real cash 
balances is sensitive to the expected rate of inflation, which in the absence of any 
meaningful interest rates, is used as a proxy measure of the cost of holding money. 
Aghevli, Khan, Narvekar, and Short (1979, 775-823) found that in LDC, the 
relatively thin markets for alternative financial assets make the substitution between money 
and real assets quantitatively more important than that between money and financial 
assets. Since changes in the administrated interest rates are made infrequently, it is 
difficult to detect any systematic empirical relationship between money and interest rates. 
Other empirical studies, by Balino (1983, 279-298) on Argentina and by Wong 
(1977, 59-86) on several Asian countries, support the idea of using either the observed or 
expected rate of inflation as the opportunity cost of holding money. 
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Coats and Khatkhate (1983, 3-33); Park (1973, 379-418) presented the hypothesis 
-
that the monetary growth in developing economy is heavily influenced by the fiscal and 
foreign sector. On the basis of that they reached the conclusion that the ability to control 
the money stock is often more limited in less developed economies. Incidentally, their 
conclusion is coincide with my finding expressed in chapter 6. 
4.2 Factors Influencing the Base's Component 
The economic development level and the institutional economic system are two 
significant factors determining the components of the monetary base in LDC. Some other 
exogenous influences different from those two factors may have an influence on the 
monetary base and the money supply, but by focusing on the broad concept of the money 
supply, those are the primary factors that influence the monetary base components, and 
will be explored as follow: 
4.2.1. Institutional Economic Systems and their Influences 
It is better to explain what is meant by institutional economic systems before 
exploring their influences on the components of the base, and by doing that, it should be 
clear how and why the countries are different in either their financial institutions or the 
size of their public sector. So in the coming part the meaning will be discussed, followed 
by the influences on the components. 
(a) The institutional structure of the economies system mainly involves many financial 
activities inside a country like: 
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• Financial transactions, foreign transactions, savings, investments, income distribution, 
-
pricing of goods and services, economic decision-making structured on the level of 
production. 
• Ownership of the means of production, including a capitalist or socialist economic 
system, ideology, and relevant motivation of economic behavior. 
• Integration mechanism, including free markets, central planning mechanism, or a 
combination of both. 
• The type of economic units classified by institutional sector, reflecting the components 
of an economic system through private/socialist enterprise, government role in 
economic regulation, role of the rest of he world, and the household transaction 
structure. 
Given the variety of institutional arrangements existing throughout the world, it is 
necessary for purposes of international comparability that the data on the monetary 
authorities' accounts include all financial assets and liabilities ascribed to the performance 
of the monetary authority's functions. In many countries a central bank has sole 
responsibility for all such functions. In other cases some of these functions are either 
partially or entirely carried out by the central government or by other official institutions. 
When the central bank performs all the functions of the monetary authorities, the 
financial assets and liabilities recorded in its balance sheet will normally provide the basic 
statistics necessary for the compilation of the monetary authorities' accounts. But these 
balance sheets of central banks are tailored to conform to each country's legal and 
administrative arrangements. Such documents may not include all accounts effectively 
under the central bank's management or may include accounts that, in financial terms, 
should be excluded from the monetary authorities' account. The typical case of monetary 
authorities' accounts that are excluded from central banks' balance sheets relates to 
exchange stabilization funds. In the meantime if the central banks perform functions other 
than those of the monetary authorities, for example, act as administrators of the public 
53 
debt or operate various non-financial business ventures, these accounts should be excluded 
from the monetary authorities' account. 
In decentralized economic decision-making, there is no significant direct influence 
by the institutional economic system. However, a significant indirect influence in 
institutional economic systems involving greater government economic intervention and 
less decentralization and freedom in economic decision-making. 
(b) The influences of the institutional economic systems (being explained) on the 
financial system and after which on the components of the monetary base could be 
summarized in four categories: 
• assuming greater central government and central bank power and responsibility to 
perform greater intervention, the central bank transactions that will generate the 
monetary base is expected to be more active in less developed economies alike 
• The stronger the government control of balance-of-payments' transactions, the 
smaller the created share of the foreign transactions in the monetary base. So we 
would expect that the foreign transactions in the monetary base is going to diminish 
as we move from capital, to social decentralized, to social centralized economic 
decision-making 
• creating the monetary base by domestic instrument, using central bank credit to the 
central government, with a similar logic as before, is going to diminish as we move 
from capital, to social decentralized, to social centralized economic decision-making. 
especially considering the great financial power of a central government with little 
need for it to use central bank credit 
• Creating the monetary base by domestic instrument, using central bank credit to 
other monetary institutions, and central bank credit to non-monetary institutions, 
with a similar logic as before, is going to diminish as we move from capital, to social 
decentralized, to social centralized economic decision-making. Moor detailed in 
these topics could be found in Dimitrije and Macesich (1991, 67-83). 
4.2.2. The Level of Economic Development and its Influences 
The economic development level of an economy mainly involves the discussion of its 
entrepreneurial efficiency, labor and capital productivity, production structure, and 
balance-of-payments' transactions. Analysis of the per capita gross national product 
(GNP) is traditionally used as the basic criterion for classification of an economy by 
economic development level. 
The manner by which the structure of monetary base could be influenced by the 
level of economic development could be summarized as: 
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• With less efficient financial markets in developing economies, and the needs of the 
central government to finance its expenditures for economic development, the central 
bank credits to central government (the most important source of the monetary base) 
is expected to be greater relative to the developed countries. 
• The needs for central bank transactions may be greater in developing economies than 
developed economies. 
• Central bank credits to other monetary institutions, should be relatively greater with 
less efficient financial markets in developing economies. Lower supply of deposits by 
non-monetary units, and low creation or withdrawal of money by foreign exchange 
transactions of these institutions, will force them to get their credits from central 
banks. 
• Central bank credits to other non-monetary institutions, which are rare in developed 
economies with their more sophisticated financial organizations, should be more 
significant in developing economies. However, this. source for the monetary base 
creation should be less significant than central· bank crediting of other monetary 
institutions in developing economies. 
• Finally, balance-of-payments' transactions of the developing economies with their 
greater sensitivity to the deterioration of foreign markets will be expected to lead to a 
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withdrawal of monetary base by foreign exchange transactions by central banks, i.e., a 
greater share of creation of monetary base by foreign transactions should be expected. 
4.3 The Sample Countries 
In choosing the sample seven countries three classification concepts have been 
considered. They are: 
(A) The concept of classification of economies by institutional economic system 
contains several approaches. The assertion is that all economic systems should be 
classified somewhere between two opposite poles on a line featuring on one end the 
capitalist economic system, which is based on the freedom to make economic decisions on 
private ownership of the means of production, and perfect market competition, and on the 
other the socialist economies with full public ownership of the means of production, full 
government command of economic developments and central planning. All of the other 
countries have been classified somewhere in between by their market affinity or the 
government influence on economic developments. The appearance of developing 
economies and the diversification of both capitalist and socialist economies has led to a 
more flexible classification of economic systems. 
A simple but practical solution for classification of economies by institutional 
economic system is the realistic presumption that the degree of freedom and decentralized 
economic decision-making may be considered representative of the institutional economic 
system. On the basis of this presumption, the practical but useful classification of 
economies in institutional economic systems may include three types in decreasing order 
of freedom and decentralization of economic decision-making: 
(1) capitalist economies, 
(2) socialist economies with decentralized economic decision-making, and 
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(3) socialist economies with centralized economic decision-making. 
-
(B) The concept of classification of economies by economic development level has its 
own structural characteristics. It is common that the researchers assume that per capita 
GNP provides a practical indication of the basic level of economic development. It is 
widely observable to use the world bank classification of economies based on per capita 
GNP. 
The large oil .exporter is not included in the classification by per capita GNP, which 
would have appeared at highest level of economic development. To avoid the disturbing 
effects of these economies, the classification of economies by per capita GNP only is 
modified by using the classification by institutional economic system. 
(C) The two-dimensional classification or the combined classification by institutional 
economic system and level of economic development in this analysis utilized the GNP 
modification and classifications made by the International Monetary Fund (International 
Financial Statistics) and the simplification by Dimitrijevic and Macesich (1991, 47). It 
classified all economies in five basic groups: 
( 1) industrial economies, 
(2) developing economies with oil exporters, 
(3) developing economies with non-oil-exporters, 
( 4) socialist with decentralized economic decision-making, and 
(5) socialist with centralized economic decision-making. 
A comparative statistical information that utilizes the information above and 
includes the countries with different institutional economic systems is presented in the 
table 4.1 below, with countries in italic letters and asterisk(*) represents countries used in 
this study's sample. 
Table 4.1 
Classification of Economies by Institutional of Economic system 
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For economies at a lower level of economic development, the study of money 
-
supply will contribute to a better understanding of the theoretical and practical aspects of 
those more highly developed economies in an attempt to incorporate their experience into 
the lower level economies. The data are not always as accurate as we would desire; in 
addition, there are substantial revisions in the data. Some of the difficulties faced in 
collecting and studying monetary data in LDC are as following: 
I. The difficulty to decide the best definition of money, for instance, which approach you 
are going to use: 
• the theoretical approach that defines money supply using economic reasoning, or 
• the empirical approach that uses the measure that best predicts inflation and business 
cycles. 
2. Central banks revise their estimates of the monetary aggregates by large amounts later 
on for expected two: 
• the central banks has to estimate the amount of small depository institutions before 
they provide the actual figures at some future dates 
• the central banks have to adjust the data for the seasonal variations. 
3. The statistical discrepancy in LDC because some of them is unrecorded, due to 
smuggling, or negligence, or national secrecy. 
4. The accounting practices generate three different aspects: 
a. there are the differences that arise because some financial institutions maintain 
their accounts on a cash basis while others use accrual accounting 
b. there are differences in valuation procedures arising from the difficulty of 
assigning a current value to certain financial instruments (particularly those that are non-
marketable or are denominated in a foreign currency) and from variations in the timing of 
valuation adjustments and the consequent timing of the distribution of profits or losses 
c. the proper coverage of a financial statement or balance sheet is an issue, 
particularly when a simple and direct causal link may be realized between a particular asset 
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and a particular liability, yielding what are regarded in the IFS as a paired account. Most 
-
financial statements pair only contingent accounts--that is, those involving the promise of 
future financial services if particular events transpire. However, the use of the term 
"contingency" varies among countries. 
For this and all of the expected difficulties, different techniques used to adjust in 
each different country, the IFS has a standard procedure to adjust national sources to 
accord with their framework rather than to recommend fundamental changes in national 
reporting system. For these and other reasons as if different technique has been held, it is 
misleading to combine data from different resources, so I restricted myself to use data 
from one resource, the IFS. 
CHAPTERV 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR FEEDBACK EFFECTS 
Although the basic framework of the analysis of the money supply is similar in all 
economies, the money supply process itself is highly differentiated depending on a variety 
of factors, such as the level of development in the financial institutions and the openness of 
the economy. 
Based on the fact that policy cannot be analyzed without some theoretical 
framework, any judgment about monetary policy has to be rooted in some view of 
monetary theory. Put another way, any act of monetary policy must make some explicit 
or implicit assumption about monetary theory. For instance, one of the factors that 
influence the choice of techniques that seek controlling any measure of money is how it is 
thought money will influence behavior, e.g., substitution between assets. 
In a closed economy, the monetary base is determined by the action of the central 
bank. In ari open economy, the base is also affected by the position of the balance of 
payments. The base is created when the central bank acquires assets in the form of net 
foreign assets (NF A) and central bank credits (loans to the government, to the public 
sector, to the private sector and to commercial banks). Changes in the stock ofNFA of 
the central bank are the result of the balance-of-payments development, i.e., changes in 
NF A of the monetary authorities reflect balance-of-payments conditions . 
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5.1 International Monetarism 
Since the quantity theory of money ignores the existence of the overseas sector, it 
is a closed economy model. In response to this,· the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments (the international monetarism) has been developed. Despite its name, this 
model is antithetical to monetarism in that it denies the direct money-income (price) link 
essential to orthodox monetarism in its approach and methodology but is radically distinct 
in its conclusions. The simplest form of international monetarism can be derived as a 
variant of the quantity theory model. One further assumption is made: the economy is a 
small one, it is a price taker and therefore is unable to influence the world price of any 
good. An increase in the money supply creates an excess demand for goods, services and 
assets. This excess demand is met by foreign suppliers (at the previously prevailing 
prices). Hence, there is no change in either domestic prices or output, so income is 
unchanged. Similarly, the price of assets is unchanged and no new domestic ones are 
produced. The effect of the increase in the money supply has merely been to create a 
balance of payments deficit by the purchase of foreign goods and assets. 
If the balance of payments deficit (surplus) exists, it creates a negative (positive) 
overseas impact on the money supply. The money supply is thus reduced (increased), and 
this continues until it reaches original level. In models like that, equilibrium in the money 
market is restored not by change in income as in the quantity theory but, instead, by a 
balance of payments deficit (surplus). In consequence, any payments surplus or deficit is 
nothing but a temporary symptom of disequilibrium in the money market. These features 
of the international monetarist have been advanced by the hypothesis that changes in the 
money supply do affect income but only indirectly, through changes in the exchange rate. 
Hence, international monetarist models are Keynesian in two senses: changes in the money 
supply may not directly affect income; if they do, the changes are made through an indirect 
transmission mechanism. 
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5.2 Money, Credit, and Monetary Base Controllability 
5.2.1 Money 
Foil owing David Gowland ( 1985, 12-1 7), money could be created in four and only 
four ways. 
(i) The Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
There will be an increase in the money supply of exactly the same amount increases 
in the difference between the government's outlays and its receipts. As the name implies it 
is the amount the government must monetize to finance its outlays. Ceteris paribus, the 
government outlays are its expenditure on goods and services, expenditure on transfer 
payments, including interest payments, purchase of assets, and loans. As far as the 
influence on money creation is considered, each has the same effect. Public sector receipts 
consist of taxation and the proceeds from sales of assets. Money creation occurs as a 
direct and inevitable consequence of government expenditure, unless this is financed by 
taxation or by borrowing from the non-bank private sector. In this case money creation 
still occurs but is exactly offset by the money destruction caused by taxation or by non-
bank private sector lending to the public sector. 
(ii) Bank Lending to the Private Sector 
This variable is seen clearly in the case of personal loans. A bank creates money, 
as the old adage puts it, "every loan creates a deposit." Moreover, this relationship is an 
exact one. The loan creates a deposit by the same amount, which came from the fact that 
a bank in making a loan exchanges a claim on itself for a claim on the borrower. The 
claim on itself is obviously a bank liability and so, by definition, part of the money supply. 
(iii) Non-Bank Private Sector Lending to the Public Sector 
The consequences on the money supply are just the same as that of taxation. The 
purchase or sale of Treasury securities is used control the money supply. If the goal is to 
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increase the money supply, a central bank may do so by purchasing Treasury securities. 
The central bank pays for these securities with checks drawn on it. These checks will be 
deposited at commercial banks. As the checks clear, the central bank will credit the 
deposits of member banks at central banks, thereby creating additional reserves for the 
banking system. In similar fashion, the money supply could decrease. This is often called 
an open market operation. 
(iv) The Overseas Impact on the Money Supply 
If a government acquires foreign currency by buying it with its domestic currency 
and its reserve rises, the money supply will rise. If it sells foreign currency, the money 
supply falls. Any such acquisition ( or sale) will have exactly the same impact on the 
money supply as when the government buys or sells any other asset. 
The crucial point of the analysis is that an acquisition of a foreign asset must be 
financed. The question posed is 'Has the government acquired or supplied any of the 
native currency?' If the answer is 'yes,' there is an overseas impact. This is positive if the 
government has supplied domestic currency and negative ifit has acquired it. If the 
answer is 'no,' hence there is no impact. An example includes government borrowing in 
foreign currency from any source including the Eurocurrency market or the IMF. Another 
form of government borrowing which does not affect the money supply is foreign 
purchases of government securities, effectively these are bought with foreign currency. 
The banking system can creates an overseas impact too. Foreigners may hold 
deposits with or borrow from domestic bank. One might choose to treat the foreigners as 
part of the non-bank private sector and so includes their deposits in the money supply, as 
the US authorities do. One need not take note of the difference between a loan to a 
resident and to a non-resident; the impact of both on the money supply is identical. This 
simple international viewpoint is not normally adapted, however, because it ignores the 
political reality that transactions with foreigners are regarded as different; if only because 
balance of payments statistics are relevant to macroeconomic policy. 
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The other aspect of money creation involving the overseas sector is that a loan to a 
foreigner will create a deposit. This deposit may be held by a resident or by a non-
resident. Hence loans to non-residents may increase the money supply but need not 
necessarily do so. This uncertainty can be resolved and the impact of deposits 
incorporated by looking at net bank claims on foreigners (loans to foreigners less foreign-
held deposits). If these rise, the money supply increases, and if net claims fall, the money 
supply reduces. 
To summarize, the impact of the overseas sector may increase the money supply in 
two ways to be added to the primary causes of monetary expansion: 
1. If the public sector acquires foreign assets and purchases them with native currency; 
2. If a bank increases its net claims on foreigners. 
In general, the money supply will be reduced in any country by: 
1. Government sale of foreign currency, 
2. An increase in foreign deposits with the banks, 
And it will be increased by: 
3. Government purchase of foreign currency, 
4. An increase in bank loans to non-residents. 
The sum of(l) to (4) is the overseas impact on the money supply. 
Those four variables need not be independent of each other. Indeed, many real-
world transactions may combine more than one transaction described above. This does 
diminish the above analysis of money creation, but instead makes it possible to make 
statements like the following: 
• Government spending will cause the money supply to rise unless financed by taxation 
or sales of debt or foreign currency to the non-bank private sector. 
• Non-bank private sector borrowing from a bank will increase the money supply 
unless the loan is used to buy foreign currency or government securities. 
5.2.2 Credit 
Since the creation of credit is likely to involve the creation of money and vice 
versa, it is important for completion to define money and credit. 
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Money is an asset hold by someone; credit is a debt owed by someone, although 
sometimes public sector borrowing is counted as part of credit and sometimes not. Bank 
liabilities are money, whereas bank assets are credit. 
Keynesians, without exception, accept that credit can influence spending. 
Benjamin Friedman (1983), a prominent Keynesian, emphasized the importance of credit 
in Keynesian analysis. They have usually stressed the availability of credit. The rationale 
of this is that both individuals and companies are unable to carry out their spending plans 
because of a lack of credit to finance them. Thus availability of credit is a binding 
constraint upon expenditure. This, of course, assumes that borrowers cannot borrow as 
much as they would like, given prevailing interest rates; that is, there is non-price rationing 
in credit markets, either as a consequence of official policy or because of market 
imperfections. 
Monetarists would not deny the possibility of this but claim that Keynesians 
assume that this is the only possible transmission mechanism for monetary policy and so 
treat monetary policy as a synonymous with credit policy. So when money and credit are 
simultaneously increased, the Keynesian looks at the borrower and said that this will 
stimulate the production of goods or services, hence output will increase, whereas the 
Monetarist looks at the effect on the holder of the deposit (the seller) and said that he 
would be influenced by the deposit ( or strictly to behave differently because the loan and 
deposit were created). 
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5.2.3 Controllability of the Base 
As far as control of the monetary base is concerned, changes in foreign assets and 
foreign liabilities, which are a reflection of the position of balance of payments, can not 
generally be considered as a variable to be directly influenced or controlled; hence they are 
named uncontrolled variables. The monetary authorities can directly control other 
variables, among which are net claims to the government, public sector, commercial banks 
and other private sectors. The latter altogether can be called "Central Bank Credits." We, 
therefore, can conclude that the controllability of any country's monetary base depends 
primarily on the degree to which the movements of the controlled variables ,Central Bank 
Credits, are offset by opposite changes in the uncontrolled components. If movements of 
Central Bank Credits are offset to a large degree, there is a little base control. 
5.2.4 The Source Base as an Intermediate Target 
To show why the source base growth may not bear any statistical relationship to 
monetary aggregate growth, consider the case in which a central bank has determined that 
the economy is growing too rapidly and decides to use open market operations to restrict 
the growth rate of a monetary aggregate. Reducing the rate of purchases of government 
securities decreases the growth rate of the source base. It has been expected that this 
decrease in base growth will be associated with a slower rate of growth of the monetary 
aggregates and, subsequently, a slower rate of growth of the economy. Now consider the 
four separate scenarios in figure 5. 1. Scenarios I and 2 illustrate this chain of events, 
which follows closely the monetary policy process originating at the policy-maker's 
decision stage and leading ultimately to economic activity. The chain of events begins 
with a decision to decrease the base, implemented through open market operations. 
In scenario 1 it is assumed that the decrease in controlled variables is associated 
with no change in NF A "the uncontrolled variables", assuming the foreign exchange rate 
clears the foreign market, which will not allow the capital mobility to interact, leaving 
NF A unchanged. decreasing the growth rate of monetary aggregate. 
In Scenario 2 the decrease in controlled variables associated with a decrease in 
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NF A. As a consequence, the reduction in source base growth is associated with a 
reduction in monetary aggregate growth. The two scenarios involve a positive association 
between source base growth and growth of monetary aggregate. So monetary policy has 
been successful in slowing the pace economic activity by reducing the monetary aggregate. 
Consider next the third scenario, in which the central bank implements the same 
policy, but because of the initial increase in domestic interest rates (accompanied with the 
reduction in source base) an inflow of foreign assets induced, in tum, the foreign assets are 
greater relative to the foreign liabilities, that will lead to an increase in the uncontrolled 
variables (NF A), perhaps sufficient enough to offset the initial decrease in the controlled 
variables (Central Bank Credits). As a consequence, the observed association between the 
decrease in source base and monetary aggregate growth, as the third panel of figure 5 .1 
indicates, is zero monetary aggregate growth. 
Finally, consider a scenario in which the central bank believes in restricting the 
present rate of economic growth by decreasing one of the controlled variables of the 
source base, however, NFA grows too fast generates a higher growth rates of the source 
base and, ultimately, faster monetary aggregate growth. In this case, there is an apparent 
absence of association between the monetary policy tools and monetary aggregate. 
My primary inference from reviewing these four scenarios is that: in each case, the 
rate of growth of the controlled variables of the source base has declined. Yet in each 
case, the final implication for monetary aggregate growth is different. For this reason, the 
source base is a poor intermediate target, and has a potential fallacy in using it alone as a 
gauge of monetary policy. 
Scenario I: Open Market Sale, No Change in NF A, Net Contractionary Effe_ct 
Decrease in 
Controlled Variables 
No Change in 
Uncontrolled Variables 
Decrease in Growth Rate 
of Monetary Aggregate 





Decrease in Growth Rate 
of Monetary Aggregate 





No Change in Growth Rate 
of Monetary Aggregate 
Scenario 4: Open Market Sale, Great Increase in NF A, Net Expansionary Effect 
Decrease in 
Controlled Variables 
l ncrease in 
ncontrolled Variable 
Figure 5.1 
Increase in Growth Rate 
of Monetary Aggregate 
Four Scenarios Relating the Growth Rate of theSource Base 
to the Growth Rate of Monetaty Aggregate 
68 
69 
5.3 Balance of Payments and the Money Supply 
A balance-of-payments transaction, surplus (deficit) in current accounts, and 
foreign exchange transactions by the monetary institutions has a significant influence on 
the money supply, especially in countries at a lower level of economic development. This 
effect is important because changes in the current accounts of the balance of payments are 
substantial in developing countries. These changes influence the foreign exchange 
transactions by monetary institutions, and in this way influence the creation of monetary 
base structure. 
The influence of the balance of payments on the money supply occurs through two 
different channels: 
1. current account surplus or deficit, a surplus of current account of balance of payments 
leads to the creation of money and reserve money, and a current account deficit leads 
to a reduction of it. 
2. the involvement of monetary institutions in foreign financial transactions in the balance 
of payments associated with the involvement of non-monetary units in these 
transactions. 
In the second group of influences on the money supply, the foreign exchange 
transactions by monetary institutions have an effect on the reserve money creation 
structure opposite to that from the surplus or deficit of balance-of-payments current 
account. If that is the case, we can say that the second group of influences on the money 
supply modifies the impact of balance of payments on the money supply. In this way, a 
surplus or deficit of current account balance of payments appears as an indirect source of 
influence on the money supply, while foreign exchange transactions by monetary 
institutions partly reflect their involvement in foreign financing representing the direct 
influence on the money supply. Consequently, this second effect source ofbalance-of-
payments influence on the money supply may become more significant than the first. 
The foreign exchange transactions could be summarized in three groups 
1. foreign exchange transactions with foreign residents; 
2. foreign exchange transactions by monetary institutions with domestic residents; 
3. semiforeign exchange and semidomestic transactions by monetary institutions with 
domestic residents (buying/selling of foreign exchange for domestic currency) that 
involve different types of buying/selling of foreign exchange between monetary 
authorities, other monetary institutions and non-monetary units. 
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It may be concluded that the first two groups of transactions have a little direct effect on 
the money supply, so that the monetary effects of balance-of-payments transactions and 
related foreign exchange transactions are accomplished mainly by the third group: 
buying/selling of foreign exchange between central banks and other monetary institutions 
for domestic currency, influencing the amount of creation/withdrawal of reserve money. 
The buying/selling of foreign exchange between monetary institutions and non-monetary 
units for domestic currency influences the amount of creation or leakage of money in 
circulation or reserve money. 
The influence of balance-of-payments transactions on the money supply reflects the 
effects of a combination of buying/selling of foreign exchange instruments for domestic 
currency, with central banks and other monetary institutions and non-monetary units as 
buyers and sellers. These transactions mirror the net changes in foreign assets and foreign 
liabilities in monetary institutions impacting on money supply, foreign assets, and foreign 
liabilities in the central banking system influencing the monetary aggregates, which in tum 
affect the economic activity. Figure 5.2 traces and clarifies the route of these effects. 
Under modem banking institutions, the banking system can offset, or "sterilize," 
some or all of the payments imbalance, keeping it from having any effect on the domestic 
money supply. Sterilization can be achieved either by the central bank or by private 
banking. Thus, a payments surplus or deficit affects the money supply only if the banking 
system does not completely sterilize the payments imbalance. 
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5.4 Money Supply and the Balance of Payments 
Under some conditions of international capital mobility, and fixed exchange rates, 
monetary policy becomes so chained to the balance of payments that it loses all ( or partial) 
control over the money market. 
The availability of foreign currency should be balanced against the demand for it, 
within the balance of payments, and the foreign exchange market. In a fixed exchange rate 
world, we should think of the overall payments surplus as a net inflow of money from 
abroad, and a deficit as an outflow of money. The surplus effects could be divided into 
trade-flow effects and financial-flow effects. The trade balance, or the current account 
balance, depends negatively on our national product and positively on the exchange rate, 
i.e. the trade balance responds positively to devaluation of the home currency. 
It is known that monetary policy will affect directly the domestic interest rate. The 
capital account of the balance of payments depends mainly on relative real interest rates 
(both home and abroad), a higher interest rate in our country will attract capital from 
abroad. This attraction will generate a balance-of-payments surplus, a money inflow, 
which is valid only in the short run. Over the longer run, this effect ceases or is even 
reversed, for at least two reasons: 
1. All loans must be repaid. No country can use higher interest rates to attract capital 
(lending) to it without reflecting the fact that those higher interest rates would have to 
be paid back out, along with borrowed principal. 
2. After the investors get attracted by the higher interest rate first, they will adjust the 
share of their stock of wealth held in loans in the home country. Soon the inflow will 
dwindle because wealth already been adjusted. 
So in the long run a higher domestic interest rate has an ambiguous effect on the overall 
balance of payments in the home county. 
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Studying the money market in an open economy allows us to trace the effects of a 
countries' monetary policies on its balance of payments. Expanding the money supply 
worsens the balance of payments, especially at first. If the central bank offers private 
domestic banks extra loanable reserves ( e.g. by buying government bonds in the open 
market), the banks will typically respond by making more loans to earn more. In the 
process, their competition to lend more is likely to bid down interest rates. As sketched in 
figure 5.3 below, the lowering of interest rates has two effects on the balance of payments: 
I . The decline in interest rates causes some holders of financial assets to seek out higher 
interest rates abroad. Their switch from lending here to lending abroad takes the form 
of selling bank deposits in their home country in order to acquire interest-bearing 
assets in other countries. Later, the current lending will repaid with interest, bringing a 
positive feedback to the balance of payments. 
2. The newly borrowed funds are used to engage in extra spending, which leads to a 
multiplied expansion of spending and national income, probably accompanied by rising 
prices. The rise in incomes and prices, in tum, raises imports and worsens the trade 
balance. In contrast to the interest rate effect, the trade balance negative effect will 
continue. 
Thus an expansion of the money supply unambiguously worsens the overall 
payments balance in the short run. Conversely, a contraction of the national money supply 
unambiguously improves the overall balance. In both cases if the effect had not been 
sterilized, it would have had a feedback on the home country money supply. Figure 5.3 
below traces and clarifies the route of these effects. 
Perfect capital mobility can rob monetary policy of its ability to influence the 
domestic economy. During periods when exchange rates stayed fixed, central bankers 
found it hard to tighten (or loosen) credit. If they tried to do so, the supply available to 
borrowers in any country or any currency will not change when central bankers tried to 
change it, and they found enough lenders to keep the interest rates from rising at all. 
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5.5 Autonomous Expansion and the Balance of Payments 
Autonomous expansion affects the balance of payments both through an income 
effect and through an interest rate effect. For instance, in the case of expansionary fiscal 
policy, the extra government purchases are likely to expand spending throughout the 
economy, raising the national product. The extra desire to spend will spill over into extra 
import demand, decreasing the trade balance and the overall balance-of-payments surplus. 
But in short-run the interest-rate effect works in the opposite direction. The extra 
government purchases increase interest rates. . The extra borrowing and higher interest 
rates should attract some lending from abroad. So it is possible that an expansionary fiscal 
policy will actually improve the balance of payments. In the long run, though, the lending 
attracted with higher interest rates must be repaid with interest, canceling the international 
reserves gained from the initial inflow of borrowed money. So the net result is probably a 
worsening of the balance, though there would be a short-run improvement if enough 
lending were attracted by the higher interest rates. Figure 5.4 below traces and clarifies 
the route of these effects until its final destination the economic activity. 
Perfect capital mobility, for autonomous spending, means enhanced control over 
the domestic economy. Expansionary fiscal policies do not rise interest rates because the 
extra government borrowing is met by a large influx of lending from abroad. Thus, the 
borrowing does not tend to crowd out private borrowers with higher interest rates, 
allowing fiscal policy its fullest multiplier effects on the economy. In other words, with 
perfect capital mobility and interest rate fixed outside the country, fiscal expansion cannot 
be guilty of crowding out private investment from lending markets. This extra potency of 
fiscal policy under fixed exchange rates and perfect capital mobility may be a poor 
substitute for the loss of monetary control since governmental handling of spending and 
taxes is notoriously crude and subject to the vagaries of policies. Yet, this is apparently a 
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CHAPTER VI 
TESTS OF MONETARY BASE ENDOGENEITY 
6.1 Introduction 
The empirical analysis of time series has a long tradition in economics, particularly 
as it concerned with the decomposition of a series into a set of unobserved components, 
traditionally taken to be the trend, cycle, seasonal, and irregular, these being associated 
with the ideas of secular evolution (or long swings), the concept of the business cycle, 
seasonal variation, and transitory influences, respectively. 
Researchers were primarily concerned with developing techniques which were 
computationally feasible and based upon local trends and levels (Holt et al. 1960); 
(Winters 1960); (Brown 1963). Exponential smoothing techniques were later shown to 
have unobserved component representations for providing a more unified framework for 
analysis (Harrison 1967). Box and Jenkins ( 1967) developed a feasible model building 
procedure for the general class of auto-regressive-integrated-moving average processes. 
The importance of synthesis between traditional econometric and time series 
techniques was brought into sharper focus by Granger and Newbold's (1974) illuminating 
analysis of the spurious regression problem. It was shown that regressing independently 
generated random walks lead to a very high probability of rejecting the correct hypothesis 
of no relationship between the two series. 
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The groundwork for using cointegration vectors in the study of nonstationary of 
the data available comes from the work of Granger ( 1981 t Granger and Weiss ( 1983 ); 
Granger and Engle (I 985); and Engle and Granger (1987). The connection with error 
correcting models has been investigated by a number of authors, Davidson (1986); Stock 
0 (1987); and Johansen (1988) among others. The suggestion of estimating the 
cointegration relations using regression has been investigated by Stock (I 987); Phillips 
and Durlauf(l986); Stock and Watson (1986); Phillips and Park (1986a, b, 1987); Phillips 
and Ouliaris (1986, 1987). Deriving the maximum likelihood estimators of cointegration 
vectors for an autoregressive process with independent Gaussian errors comes from the 
work of Johansen (1988). 
6.2 The Model 
In the preceding chapters, a discussion of the theoretical mechanism of the 
monetary base in seven different countries was produced. In this chapter, the elements 
that have been laid out in the preceding discussions are subjected to empirical 
examination. I rely on the theoretical relationships among variables presented earlier for a 
set of structural equations that can be combined to describe the monetary base in a typical 
country. This process will proceed with avoiding the complicated details in LDC, keeping 
in mind a high level of an explanatory power to explore the relationship between the base 
components. 
Examining the behavior of the monetary base is important for understanding the 
ability of the monetary authorities in LDC to influence their monetary aggregates and 
achieves macroeconomic goals. The assumption of controllability of the monetary base is 
the particular comer of the testing. Especially, after the major determinants of the base 
are specified in order to check its controllability and endogeneity. The base components 
and their distribution reproduced in figure 6.1 below to be utilized in the coming sections. 
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Figure 6.1 Alternative Categorizations of the Base Components 
B= FA-FL-LTFB + CG-GD + CCB+cPS+cO I +c02-FC0D-CF-CA-OI-ID 
B= NFA + GA + CCB+cPS+cOI +c02-FC0D-CF-CA-OI-ID 
V 
B= UNCONT + CONT 
B= NFA + CONTI =CONT+ GA 
The chart above facilitates the understanding of the base components, and how 
they are distributed to generate the coming two main base equations (6.5) and (6.7), that 
are to be utilized through the work on levels or differences, based on these definitions: 
NFA =FA-FL -LTFB (6.1) 
~=00-00 ~~ 
UNCONT = NFA + GA (6.3) 
CONT= CCB +CPS+ COI + CO2 - FCOD - CF - CA- 01 - ID (6.4) 
From equations (6.1) through (6.4), 
Defining 
CONTI =CONT+ GA 
We get 
The notation for differencing is: 
From Scenario I in the chart above and equation (6.5) we can get 
One lagged difference 
Al= UNCONTt - UNCONTt-1 
All= CONTt- CONTt-1 
Three lagged difference 
A3 = UN CONT t - UNCONT t-3 
A33 = CONTt - CONTt-3 
Twelve lagged difference 
AI2 = UNCONTt - UNCONTt-12 









From Scenario 2 in the chart above and equation (6.7) we can get 
One lagged difference 
Bl= NF At - NFAt-1 
Bl I= CONTlt - CONTlt-1 
Three lagged difference 
B3 = NF At - NFAt-3 
B33 = CONTlt - CONTlt-3 
Twelve lagged difference 
Bl2 = NF At - NFAt-12 








Data employed were from the IFS, monthly, and vary in time periods between 





1962.01 - 1991.05 
1969.06 - 1991.08 
1966.09 - 1991.06 
1957.01 - 1991.08 
Thailand 1960.01 - 1991. 09 
United Arab Emirates 1975.01 - 1991.09 
United States 1957.01 - 1991.09 
The centerpiece ofthe difference between equations (6.5) and (6.7) is GA, IfGA 
is considered as an uncontrolled component, it is added to the UNCONT variable, leaving 
CONT variable as the rest of the components, equation (6.5). But, if GA treated as 
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controlled component, the controlled variable become CONTI variable, leaving the NFA 
alone to be treated as the only uncontrolled variable, generating equation ( 6. 7). 
The relevant issue is whether fluctuations in the uncontrolled components in the 
source base can be offset by the actions of central bank, so that the monetary authorities 
are able to provide a particular quantity of base money. The controllability of the 
monetary base depends primarily on the degree to which the movements of a central bank 
credits are offset by opposite changes in the uncontrolled components. If movements of 
central bank credits are offset to a large degree, there may be a little base control, 
otherwise it is controlled. 
It is generally recognized that estimation and testing of structural hypotheses using 
time series data must pay attention to the regression residuals. They may display 
systematic behavior that is inconsistent with the classical assumptions. In particular, it was 
recognized that the residuals from time series regressions are usually autocorrelated. 
Relying on classical regression methods when errors are serially correlated does not affect 
the unbiasedness or consistency of the estimators, but it does affect their efficiency. Tests 
for autocorrelation are the next topics to be taken up in this chapter. 
The next section deals with stationarity test, followed by the cointegration test, 
then checking the stationarity of the first differences, after which the appropriate 
regression accompanied by Lagrange multiplier test statistic for autocorrelation will be 
applied, finally graphical display and the causality test. 
It is important to note here that in each test there are three main parts: 
a. description of the test, 
b. the empirical results, and 
c. conclusions and comments. 
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6.3 Stationarity 
When considering the relationship between two or more time series variables, an 
important consideration that of stationarity. This requires the process to be in a particular 
state of 'statistical equilibrium' (Box and Jenkines 1976, 26.) A process is said to be 
stationary if its properties are unaffected by a change of time origin, in other words, the 
joint probability distribution at any set of times t1, t2, t3, .... , tm must be the same as joint 
probability distribution at times t1 + k, t2 + k,······ tm + k· where k is an arbitrary shift 
along the time axis. Form= 1, this implies that the marginal probability distribution at 
time t is the same as the marginal probability distribution at any other point in time. Hence 
the marginal distribution does not depend on time, which in turn implies that the mean and 




and the covariances are functions only of the lag k, and not of time t, for all k, 
Cov (x1, x1+k) = Cov (x2, x2+k) = ... = Cov (xn-k, xn) = Cov (xt, Xt-k) (6.22) 
In short, if a series has a finite mean, finite variance and finite covariances, i.e., all 
of which are independent of time, this series is defined as stationary. For instance if we 
have 
NFAt=m+pNFAt-1 +e (6.23) 
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Where m and p are parameters and the e's are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance, the regression process is stationary if 
1 <p<l. If p = 1 the equation defines a random walk with drift and NF A is then 
nonstationary. Thus the null hypothesis for testing nonstationarity is that the absolute 
value of p should equal unit: 
Ho: p = 1 
To test this hypothesis, equation (6.23) is re-specified as 
a NFA= m +yNFAt-1 + e 
Where fl. NFA = NF At - NFAt-1 , the first difference of the NFA series. 




By estimating y, at-statistic for r may be used to test the significance ofy. It is 
important to notice here that in checking for stationarity, the t-statistic cannot be referred 
to the critical values in the standard 't' table. That table no longer applies, because of the 
possibility of nonstationarity existence. More recently Mackinnon "Critical Values for 
Cointegration Tests", Working Paper, University of California, San Diego, January 24, 
1990, has implemented a large set of replications, and has estimated response surfaces 
regressions over these replications. These critical values are incorporated into the results 
in the corresponding appropriate places. 
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Using the regression which is referred to as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
regression to generalize the previous regression to higher order process can be done by 
using the lag operator L, where 
Ll =NFAt-1, 
L2 = NF At-2 etc. 
' 
(6.25) 
The general autoregressive process of order p may be written in the form 
A(L) NFA= m + e (6.26) 
where A(L) is a polynomial of degree pin the lag operator, that is 
A(L) = I - CX}L - azL2 - .... - <lpLP (6.27) 
Replacing L by unity gives 
A(l) = I - a1 - a2 - .... - ap (6.28) 
So that A(l) indicates the sum of all the coefficients in the autoregressive scheme. To test 
whether the pth order process has a unit root, rewrite A(L) as 
A(L) = (1-pL )B(L) (6.29) 
Where B(L) is a polynomial of degree (p-1) in the lag operator. Replacing L by unity in 
this expression gives 
A(l) = (1-p) B(l) (6.30) 
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Thus if the series under investigation has a unit root then A(l) equals zero, that is, 
the sum of all the autoregressive coefficient will be zero. Straightforward estimation of 
the AR(p) process yields estimates of the <Xi coefficients. These do not permit a simple 
test of the null hypotheses since these coefficients are all functions of the p parameter. 
However, a simple test can be obtained by rearranging the autoregression to isolate the p 
parameter. The appropriate rearrangement is 
A(NFA) = m - A(l)NFAt-1 + 62A(NFAt-1) + 63A(NFAt-2) + ... 6pA(NFA_p+I) 
(6.31) 
Where the 6 coefficients are functions of the a's. Thus under the null hypothesis of a unit 
root the coefficient ofNFAt-1 will be zero. If p<l the coefficient ofNFAt-1 will be 
negative. 
6.3.1 Empirical Results of Testing for Stationarity on the Levels 
The components of the base that have been presented algebraically for a typical 
country in equation (3.5) and in figure (6.1), which rewritten again for simplicity 
Bs = NFA +GA+ CPS +COi + CCB + CO2 
- FCOD - ID - CF - CA - 01 (6.32) 
These components have been netted in equations (6.5) and (6.7), that left the base 
with either UN CONT and CONT, or NF A and CONT 1. The attempt to investigate the 
stationarity of these components by applying the previous application, in particular, the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller regression (6.31), yields results that are summarized in table 6.1 
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Table 6.1 Stationarity Test on the Series Level 
Egypt 
UNCONT 0.0013 0.2993 350 I -3.9821 I -3.4221 I -3.1339 I 
CONT 0.0265 1.0596 
NFA -0.0154 -1.1033 
CONTI 0.0062 0.6468 
Indonesia 
UNCONT 0.1373 -3.2098*** 624 I -4.0068 I -3.4322 I -3.1389 I 
CONT -0.1344 -3.3324*** 
NFA -0.0365 -1.5751 
CONTI -0.0640 -2.1632 
Kenya 
UNCONT -0.0089 -0.4348 295 I -3.9943 I -3.4271 I -3.1364 I 
CONT -0.2290 -3.7697** 
NFA -0.0420 -2.6747 
CONTI -0.0070 -0.6317 
Mexico 
NFA -0.0290 -2.6046 413 I -3.9822 I -3.4217 I -3.1335 I 
CONTI -0.0253 -2.4547 
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(Table 6.1 concluded) Stationarity Test on the Series Level 
Thailand 
UNCONT 0.0080 1.5730 378 I -3.9899 I -3.4248 I -3.1349 I 
CONT 0.0040 0.3793 
NFA 0.0305 8.4978 * 
CONTI 0.0302 5.8060 * 
United Arab Emirates 
UNCONT -0.5466 -5.5778 * 198 I -4.0042 I -3.4323 I -3.1398 I 
CONT -0.2743 -4.0100 * 
NFA -0.2324 -3.4804 ** 
CONTI -0.1074 -2.4268 
United States of America 
UNCONT 0.0025 0.5079 414 I -3.9821 I -3.4216 I -3.1334 I 
CONT -0.1829 -5.0047 * 
NFA -0.0010 -0.3016 
CONTI -0.0071 -0.9015 
Where: 
" 5 is the coefficient of the series at the previous period (t-1) 




Statistically significant at I percent level 
Statistically significant at 5 percent level 
Statistically significant at IO percent level 
6.3.2 Conclusions of Test on the Levels 
In general, a larger t-statistic in absolute value allows the rejection of the 
hypothesis of a unit root and suggests that the series is stationary. 
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In table 6.1 failing to reject the null, that the series are nonstationary, is a common 
result for most of the series, the t-statistic is smaller in absolute value than the reported 
Mackinnon critical values, which indicates that the hypothesis of nonstationarity and the 
existence of a unit root cannot be rejected. In other words the unit root exists, and the 
series are integrated of order one, I( 1 ). So we can tell that the variance goes to infinity as 
time 't' goes to infinity, and the autocorrelation coefficient goes to 'l' as 't' goes to infinity. 
So the need for an extension to the analyses exists to get unbiased expectation hypothesis. 
Thailand and United Arab Emirates are the only countries that have a stationary 
series, but the series are not cointegrated, as it shown in the coming test, after which their 
cases will be discussed. 
6.4 Cointegration Test 
As we have seen through the model building process outlined in the previous 
sections, stationarity of the monetary base components' series have not been achieved on 
the levels. A simple extension of the analysis enables sample autocorrelation and cross-
correlation functions to be employed usefully in the model identification to get unbiased 
expectations hypothesis. The extension of the analysis called cointegration test. 
Granger and Newbold (1974, 111-120; 1977, 202-214); Plosser and Schwert 
(1978, 637-660); and Nelson and Plosser(1982, 139-162) discussed the importance of 
transformation methods to achieve stationarity, especially in economic time series. They 
found that a great many economic time series are indeed adequately characterized as I( 1) 
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process, and they examine how serially correlated errors invalidate conventional 
procedures of inference. Stationarity is by no means an innocuous one in the important 
context of inference in multiple time series regressions. Nonstationarity makes the 
regression equations have high R2 statistics and typically display highly autocorrelated 
residuals, indicated by very low Durbin-Watson (DW) Statistics. They contents that, in 
such situations, the usual significance tests performed on the regression coefficients can be 
very misleading, and they provide Monte Carlo simulation evidence to show that the 
conventional significance tests are seriously biased towards rejection of the null hypothesis 
ofno relationship, and hence towards acceptance of the false relationship. 
These worries center around the existence of long-run, steady state equilibria, a 
concept that economic theory devotes considerable attention to. To develop this 
argument, consider having two time series, UNCONT and CONT, each of which is 
integrated of order one, 1(1). Then in general a new series can be formed as a linear 
combination ofUNCONT and CONT, integrated of order zero, i.e., stationary. The linear 
combination of the two series would be written as 
UNCONT = ex + Ji CONT + µ (6.33) 
or 
µ = UNCONT - ex - Ji CONT (6.34) 
After rearrangement, the disturbance term,, is a linear combination ofUNCONT and 
CONT. To discover the relationship between the two series the disturbance term should 
be stationary. To put it differently, If theµ series has a unit root its variance will explode. 
CONT would then be of little use in explaining UN CONT. If, on the other hand, µ is 
stationary, UNCONT and CONT series are said to be cointegrated. Their time paths will 
tend to move roughly together and will not diverge without limit. 
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6.4.1 Empirical Results 
Two or more variables are said to be cointegrated if individually each is 
nonstationary but there exists a linear combination of the variables that is stationary. I 
attempted to find the appropriate linear combination of the two series UN CONT and 
CONT from equation (6.5) on one hand, and the other two series NFA and CONTI from 
equation (6. 7) on the other hand, by estimating the cointegrating regression between the 
current values of the variables, then test whether that linear combination of the variables is 
stationary by applying the appropriate test to the residuals from the regression. I chose to 
produce test statistics using two lagged values in the augmented tests. The augmented 
cointegration tests of this study also use two lagged differences. The cointegrating 
regression estimated for UNCONT and CONT series is: 
UNCONT = a + 61 CONT + 62 Trend (6.35) 
And then the residuals from this regression (6.35) are tested by: 
D(RESID) = <l>t RESIDt-1 + <1>2 D(RESIDt-I) + <1>3 D(RESIDt- 2) (6.36) 
Repeating the same process for the other two series, the cointegrating regression 
estimated for NF A and CONT I series is: 
NFA = ro + l1CONTI + A.2 Trend (6.37) 
And then the residuals from this regression are tested by: 
(6.38) 
92 
After which the test for stationarity (cointegration) against the null hypothesis of 
1(1) non-cointegration is implemented, using ADF test and MacKinnon critical values. 
The results are reported in table 6.2 below. 
Table 6.2 Cointegration Tests Within the Monetary Base Components 
Egypt 
UNCONT & CONT - 0.0137 - 1.6127 - 4.3678 1- 3.8061 1- 3.5160 I 
NFA& CONTI - 0.0288 - 2.1745 
Indonesia 
UNCONT & CONT - 0.0479 - 1.9129 - 4.3936 1- 3.8202 1- 3.5241 I 
NFA& CONTI - 0.0290 - 1.4104 
Kenya 
UNCONT & CONT - 0.0368 - 1.2805 - 4.3808 1- 3.8135 1- 3.5205 I 
NFA& CONTI - 0.0509 - 2.6115 
Mexico 
NFA& CONTI - 0.0302 - 2.7111 -4.3629 -3.8031 -3.5132 
Thailand 
UNCONT & CONT - 0.1493 - 5.1977 * -4.3706 1-3.8071 1-3.51531 
NFA&CONTl - 0.0420 - 3.1467 
United Arab Emirates 
UNCONT & CONT - 0.1845 - 3.0849 - 4.4037 1- 3.8279 1- 3.5321 I 
NFA&CONTl - 0.1791 - 3.0317 
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(Table 6.2 concluded) Cointegration Tests Within the Monetary Base Components 
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<1>1 & 'VI 
- 0.0211 - 1.8721 -4.3628 I -3.8031 1-3.5131 I 
- 0.0378 - 2.5475 ·-· . ~ 
is the estimated coefficient of the regression' residual at the 
previous period (t-1) in equations (6.36) and (6.38) respectively 






Statistically significant at I percent level 
Statistically significant at 5 percent level 
Statistically significant at IO percent level 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller regression for each country is estimated 
over the whole periods indicated in the model above, in monthly 
bases 
6.4.2 Conclusions of Cointegration Tests 
Generally, as mentioned before, two or more variables are said to be cointegrated 
if individually each is nonstationary, i.e., has one or more unit roots, but their exists a 
linear combination of the variables that is stationary. In my attempted to find the 
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appropriate linear combination of the series by estimating a cointegrating regression 
-
between the current values of the variables, and then test whether that linear combination 
is stationery by testing the residual from the regression, and knowing that for a stationary 
disturbance the t-statistic will be negative and the hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if 
the t-statistic lies to the left of the relevant Mackinnon critical value. In the table 6.2 
above all the t-statistic located to the write of the critical values, which means that we fail 
to reject the hypothesis of non-cointegration, and the unit root exists in the disturbance 
term, i.e., the linear combination of the series is non-stationary, which will not validate any 
regression on the levels and imposes the investigation and probably the uses of the first 
difference. 
The case of Thailand and United Arab Emirates where series were stationary on 
the levels, after doing the cointegration test, all UAE's series and NFA, CONTI series 
from Thailand was not cointegrated, which imposes the use of the first difference like all 
of the rest of the series for all the seven countries. The only exception I found so far is the 
UNCONT and CONT series in Thailand which are stationary on the levels and 
cointegrated, indicating the validation of the regression on the level. I executed that and 
their results, which are similar to the rest of the countries, have been presented separately 
in the coming model estimates section. 
6.4.3 Empirical Results of Testing for Stationarity on the First Difference 
Table 6.3 below represents an application for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
regression to the first difference of all the components of the monetary base. Although, 
many economic time series are not stationary, the first difference of the series could be 
stationary. If that is the case, as I mentioned before, the original series is said to be 
integrated of order one, 1(1), i.e., nonstationary, and the first difference series is said to be 
integrated of order zero, 1(0), i.e., stationary. 
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Table 6.3 Stationarity Test on the First Difference 
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Egypt 
UNCONT -0.8585 -9.2829 * 349 I -3.9826 I -3.4222 I -3.1340 I 
CONT -0.9484 -9.4779 * 
NFA -1.5482 -12.6729 * 
CONTI -1.3972 -12.8239 * 
Indonesia 
UNCONT -1.5484 -12.4279 * 623 I -4.0086 I -3.4329 I -3.1392 I 
CONT -1.6353 -12.3659 * 
NFA -1.0734 -10.5239 * 
CONTI -1.3261 -11.4050 * 
Kenya 
UNCONT -2.2497 -14.3307 * 294 I -3.9945 I -3.4272 I -3.1365 I 
CONT -2.2456 -13.9563 * 
NFA -1.0125 -10.5417 * 
CONTI -1.2179 -11.0329 * 
Mexico 
UNCONT NA NA 412 I -3.9823 I -3.4217 I -3.1335 I 
CONT NA NA 
NFA -0.5146 -7.7151 * 
CONTI -0.7098 -8.7947 * 
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(Table 6.3 concluded) Stationarity Test on the First Difference 
iltBllli11i1ll!UJ1r!!lil!lilllm[•1•1111111:111111:111:111u1:1111111111••11&111•111111111111· 
Thailand 
UNCONT -0.9402 -10.4433 * 377 I -3.9902 I -3.4249 I -3.1350 I 
CONT -1.1985 -11.9282 * 
NFA -0.5158 -7.3141 * 
CONTI -0.5624 -7.6059 * 
CONT2 -0.5623 -7.6054 * 
United Arab Emirates 
UNCONT -2.1178 -11.9430 * 197 I -4.0044 I -3.4324 I -3.1399 I 
CONT -2.0803 -12.3112 * 
NFA -1.9232 -10.8269 * 
CONTI -1.7380 -10.0856 * 
United States of America 
UNCONT -1.6871 -16.4597 * 413 I -3.9822 I -3.4217 I -3.1335 I 
CONT -1.4860 -14.7615 * 
NFA -0.5266 -8.0428 * 
CONTI -0.1653 -15.4346 * 
Where: 
I\ 
r is the coefficient of the difference series at the previous period (t-1) 




Statistically significant at 1 percent level 
Statistically significant at 5 percent level 
Statistically significant at 10 percent level 
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6.4.4 Conclusions of Test on the First Difference 
Although, most of the monetary base components' series are not stationary on the 
levels, the first difference of these series are stationary. So we can tell that, in 
regression analysis, the variance of a series is finite, and the autocorrelation's coefficient 
decrease steadily in magnitude as time extended, so that their sum is finite, which validates 
that analysis. This facilitates testing the relationships between the monetary base 
components, and exploring the behavior of foreign sector, government, public scoter, 
commercial banks, private sector, and monetary authorities together in a typical country. 
As far as control on the monetary base is concerned, NF A which is the reflection 
of the balance of payments, can not generally be considered as a variable to be controlled. 
GA on the other hand, could be seen in two different fashions. First, uncontrolled 
variations that can not be used as an active instrument to adjust the base and usually 
adjusted passively to the government's budget position. Secondly, as a controlled variable 
that could be used as an effective instrument in controlling the monetary aggregate or to 
achieve an ultimate macroeconomic goal. These issues along with others will be detected 
in the next section, the model estimates. 
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6.5 Model Estimates 
The regression to be estimated in scenario 1 is: 
Al = ao + a 1 All + µ (6.33) 
And the regression to be estimated in scenario 2 is: 
Bl= Jio + Ji1 Bll + e (6.34) 
The above equations indicate how the endogenous variables of the model, either 
(NF A + GA) or (NF A only), respond to the policy action imposed by a central bank that 
tries to control the sources of the monetary base. The offsetting response is indicated by 
coefficient a1 in scenario 1, and Ji1 in scenario 2. If the uncontrolled components of the 
source base, either (NFA + GA) or (NFA only), are able to completely offset every change 
in controlled components, either a1 or Ji1 is minus one. This means that the central bank 
does not nave any capability to control the monetary base, every policy action will result in 
the opposite changes of the uncontrolled components. The long run effect will simply be 
to change the composition of the source base. 
Table 6.4 represents the regression results of equations (6.33) and (6.34) for seven 
countries. Each sample period has been estimated with three kinds of data: monthly data 
(monthly growth), quarterly data (growth between quarters data), and yearly data (annual 
growth). This comparison is necessary to see how the changes of controlled components 
behave relative to any changes of uncontrolled components of the monetary base to 
restrain it, and vice versa how the uncontrolled components change relative to those who 
considered controlled to offset that changes, and when these behaviors take place. All the 
results are indicated in the following table, 6.4, and discussed in the section after. 
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Table 6.4 The Offsetting Power of Changes in UNCONT or NFA 
Over CONT or CONTI Respectively in Seven Different Countries. 
EGYPT 
Offsetting Coefficient R2 AR's 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-1 (Al) 0.1107 0.1696 2, 3, 8, 10, 11, 
(0.0631) 12 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-3 (A3) 0.1984 0.7328 I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
(0.0604) 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-12 (AI2) 0.2590 0.9284 I, 2, 4, 9 
(0.0566) 
NFAt- NFAt-1 (Bl) - 0.7242 0.9095 2, 10, 11 
(0.0134) 
NFAt - NFA1_ 3 (B3) - 0.7025 0.9500 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
(0.0143) 7, 9, 11, 12 
NFAt - NFAt- 12 (BI2) - 0.6308 0.9790 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 
(0.0169) 10, 11, 12 
INDONESIA 
Offsetting Coefficient R2 AR's 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-1 (Al) - 0.7595 
(0.0187) 
0.8625 I 
UNCONT1- UNCONTt-3 (A3) - 0.7917 0.9215 I, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 
(0.0202) IO 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-12 (AI2) - 0.8097 0.9602 
(0.0188) 
NFAt - NFAt-1 (Bl) - 0.7647 0.7950 1, 3 
(0.0222) 
NFAt- NFAt- 3 (B3) - 0.8044 0.9256 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 
(0.0235) IO 
NFAt-NFAt- 12 (BI2) - 0.8292 0.9155 
(0.0222) 
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(Table 6.4 concluded) 
C 
KENYA 
Offsetting Coefficient R2 AR's 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-1 (Al) - 0.9563 
(0.0399) 
0.7306 1 
UNCONTt- UNCONTt-3 (A3) - 1.0203 0.6608 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 
(0.0592) 9 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-12 (Al2) - 1.1426 0.8173 1, 2, 3, 4, 12 
(0.0597) 
NFAt - NFAt-1 (Bl) - 0.4565 0.4891 2, 9, IO 
(0.0291) 
NFAt- NFAt- 3 (B3) - 0.5078 0.8367 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 
(0.0278) 
NFAt- NFAt- 12 (B12) -.5202 0.9287 1, 3, 4, 12 
(0.0345) 
MEXICO 
Offsetting Coefficient R2 AR's 
NFAt - NFAt-1 (Bl) - 0.8691 0.7184 1, 2, 3 
(0.0252) 
NFAt - NFAt-3 (B3) - 0.7886 0.9412 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 
(0.0240) 10, 11, 12 
NFAt- NFAt- 12 (Bl2) - 0.8689 0.9878 1, IO 
(0.0226) 
THAILAND 
Offsetting Coefficient R2 AR's 
UNCONT t - UNCONTt-1 (Al) - 0.7003 0.3684 2 
(0.0500) 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-3 (A3) - 0.7655 0.8079 1, 2, 3, IO 
. (0.0413) 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-12 (Al2) - 0.9082 0.9714 1, 2, 3, IO 
(0.0326) 
NFAt - NFAt-1 (Bl) - 0.7161 .6241 2 
(0.0315) 
NFAt- NFAt- 3 (B3) - 0.8242 0.9167 1, 2, 3, IO 
(0.0325) 
NFAt - NFAt- 12 (B12) - 0.9714 0.9949 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 
(0.0245) 10, 12 
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(Table 6.4 concluded) 
C 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
Offsetting Coefficient R2 AR's 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-1 (Al) - 2.1440 0.9179 1 
(0.0492). 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-3 (A3) -2.0574 0.9149 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10 
(0.0517) 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-12 (AI2) - 2.0144 0.9313 1, 3, 4, 12 
(0.0490) 
NFAt - NFAt-1 (BI) - 2.1884 0.9370 l 
(0.0437) 
NFAt-NFAt- 3 (B3) - 2.1022 0.9360 I, 3, 4, 6, 7 
(0.0462) 
NFAt -NFAt- 12 (BI2) -2.0900 0.9592 1, 3, 10, 12 
(0.0488) 
UNITED STA TES OF AMERICA I 
Offsetting Coefficient R2 AR's 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-1 (Al) 0.7253 0.5216 1, 12 
(0.0623) 
UNCONTt - UNCONTt-3 (A3) 0.8213 0.4959 I, 2, 3 
(0.0784) 
UNCONTt- UNCONTt-12 (Al2) 0.8971 0.9101 1, 3, 8, 9, 12 
(0.0637) 
NFAt - NFAt-1 (Bl) - 0.0677 0.1788 1 
(0.0120) 
NFAt-NFAt- 3 (B3) - 0.0563 0.7563 I, 2 
(0.0122) 
NFAt - NFAt- 12 (BI2) - 0.1714 0.9657 I, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
(0.0199) 12 
• Note: Standard Errors for coefficients appear in parentheses below relevant 
coefficients. 
• Offsetting coefficients are a1 and ~1 in equations (6.33) and (6.34) respectively. 
• AR's Indicate number of serial correlated disturbances have been counted for as 
an indication of autocorrelated disturbances. 
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6.5.1 Model Estimates Conclusion 
It was an interesting experiment to use the regression estimation explained in 
equations (6.33) and (6.34) to examine the controllability of the monetary base in seven 
different countries, and to explore how the endogenous variables of the model, UNCONT 
or NF A, respond to a policy action imposed by a central bank using the controlled 
variables, CONT or CONT 1. 
Table 6.4 presents the regression results. It gives a clear picture of the ability of 
the uncontrolled components (NFA + GA) or (NFA only) of the source base to offset any 
policy actions utilizing the controlled components. Put it differently, it gives clear picture 
of the ability of the controlled components (CONT) or (CONTI) of the source base to 
restrain any undesirable changes in its uncontrolled components. The difference between 
those two ideas, and which one initiate the interaction, will be explored in the causality 
test at the end of this chapter. 
The offsetting response is indicated by coefficient a1 in scenario 1 equation (6.33), 
and f31 in scenario 2 equation (6.34). All the coefficient signs are negative, except for 
Egypt and USA in scenario 1 ( a 1 coefficient). The major estimation results are as 
follows: 
1. When one month lagged difference considered, the ability to offset changes in CONT 
movements by changes in (UN CONT) movements represented by a 1 coefficient ranked 
the countries as follow: 
UAE (- 2.1440), Kenya (- 0.9563), Indonesia (- 0. 7595), Thailand (- 0. 7003), 
Egypt (0.1107), USA (0. 7253) 
Where the ability to offset changes in CONTI movements by changes in (NFA) 
movements represented by f31 coefficient ranked the seven countries as follow: 
UAE (- 2.1884), Mexico (- 0.8691), Indonesia (- 0.7647), Egypt (- 0.7242), 
Thailand (- 0.7161), Kenya (- 0.4567), USA (- 0.0677) 
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The explanatory power R2 ranked from 16.96 % in Egypt to 93.70 % in UAE, indicating 
the variety of the ability to offset between the countries. In this interval, time is too short 
for the uncontrolled components of the base to adjust to the changes in central bank 
credits, and to induce making a generalized conclusion. 
2. When three months lagged difference considered, the ability to offset changes in CONT 
movements by changes in (UNCONT) movements represented by al coefficient is higher 
than the case above, it ranked the countries as follow: 
UAE (- 2.0574), Kenya (-1 .0203), Indonesia (- 0.7917), Thailand (- 0.7655), 
Egypt (0.1984), USA (0.8213) 
Where the ability to offset changes in CONT 1 movements by changes in (NF A) 
movements represented by 131 coefficient is also higher and ranked the seven countries as 
follow: 
UAE (-2.1022), Thailand (- 0.8242), Indonesia (- 0.8044), Mexico (- 0. 7886), 
Egypt (- 0.7025), Kenya (- 0.5078), USA(- 0.0563). 
The explanatory power R2 is relatively high, and ranked from 49.59 % in USA to 95.00 % 
in Egypt, indicating the variety of the ability to offset between the countries like the case 
above. In this interval, the time is reasonably longer to show that the offsetting ability is 
higher for the uncontrolled components of the base to adjust to the changes in central 
bank credits. 
3. When twelve months lagged difference considered, the results are dramatically high, 
using the corresponding domestic currency for each country, every 100.00 of that 
currency change in CONT variable will be offset by a very big opposite change in 
UNCONT variable reached 201.44 in United Arab Emirates and 114.26 in Kenya, that 
offsetting power is represented by a I coefficient, and shown in the table below that 
included ranking the countries for the purpose of simple clear comparison: 
Kenva - 1.1426 .817 
Thailand - 0.9082 .971 
Indonesia - 0. 8097 .960 
Egypt 0.2590 .928 
USA 0.8971 .910 
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Where the ability to offset changes in CONTI movements by changes in (NFA) 
movements represented by ~ I coefficient is also very big reached 209 percent in U AE and 
97 .14 percent in Thailand, and ranked the seven countries as follow: 
!!!lllllll!:l[IIIIIIJ!lilllillli:::i1111:1:1111:11:1::1::1::]ililillilll::1111:1111111:111:1i::1:111:1 
UAE - 2.0900 .959 
Thailand - 0.9714 .995 
Mexico - 0.8689 .988 
Indonesia - 0.8292 .976 
Egypt - 0.6308 .979 
Kenva - 0.5202 .929 
USA - 0.1714 .966 
The explanatory power R2 is v.ery high, and ranked from 81.73 % in Kenya to 99.49 % in 
Thailand, indicating that the very high ability to offset for those countries are explained 
well by the explanatory variables. In this interval, the time is long enough to show that the 
offsetting ability is higher for the uncontrolled components of the base to adjust to the 
changes in central bank credits.· 
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4. The results indicated support the hypothesis that every policy action concerning central 
banks' credits will be either neutralized or overcome significantly by opposite changes in 
either the NFA plus GA (considering GA uncontrolled variable) or NFA only, especially in 
LDC. 
In detecting the controllability of the base, more study to the behavior of NF A is 
needed to see with more insight its offsetting power. NF A reflects the balance of 
payments' position in a typical country, and comprises a high percentage of the source 
base, especially in the LDCs. To detect the offsetting power of NF A that varies positively 
with the countries' degree of openness, the series Export, Import, and GNP in the seven 
countries under investigation in an annual bases from the IFS data were used. By adding 
Export plus Import and dividing the results by GNP for each country, as a measure of 
openness, I got the results presented in the table below that roughly could represent how 
each country is open to the rest of the world, by measuring how much international trade 
it gets engaged in. The results below supports my previous results in the sense that, the 
more open the economy, the less the controllability power of the country's central bank 
over their monetary base, and changes in monetary base, in tum, are linked to the 
positions of balance of payments and in some sense government budget. 







6.6 Graphical Display 
In the process of examining the controllability of the base, the charts of the 
variables supported the proceeding regression results. It confirms with the results and 
makes it very clear that the long run effect of changing one of the controlled components 
of the source base will be ended up with changing in the composition of the source of the 
monetary base only. In other words, any changes in the central bank' credits imposed will 
cause opposite changes in either NF A plus GA or NF A only, lifting the long run effect 
with changing the composite of the base. Two charts followed for each country, one plot 
UNCONT against CONT, and the other plot NFA against CONTI, the series that has 
been defined before and used in the regressions. The graphed has been scaled to the 
nearest logical upper and lower limits automatically, and designed to get more 
understandable picture about the relation between the variables exhibited. 
I should mention that although data displays are easier to interpret than tabular 
representations of the same data, it could also be unhelpful, exaggerated and even 
deliberately deceiving. They can also be one of the most powerful techniques of 
exploratory analysis available and become a mean of conveying complex and changing 
relationships in a simple flexible manner. 
This part is explicitly concerned with the Graphical Display as an area of 
exploratory time series analysis to the relationships between variables under investigation, 
it shows how they move in opposite directions that made the controllability unattainable, 
this will lead to better models, more efficient and greater understanding of the 
relationships between the data at hand, the underlying econ~mic theory, and the modeling 
techniques employed accompanied by its results. 
A great deal of research has been carried out recently on the theory of graphical 
perception, leading to a much deeper understanding of the scientific foundations 
underlying graph construction, Tufte (1983), Cleveland and McGill (1987). Tukey and 
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6.7 Causality Test 
Does NFA cause CONTI variables? Does CONTI variable cause NFA? This can 
be determined by examining whether or not lagged information on CONT I has any 
significant role in explaining NF A in the presence of lagged NF A itself, what has come to 
be known in economics as Granger causation testing. In the outset, it has to be noted that 
correlation does not necessarily imply causation in any meaningful sense of the word. The 
test considers the following equations: 
(6.35) 
(6.36) 
Where l1(r), l2(r), 61(r), and 62(r) are polynomials in the lag operator, r. 
For example, l1(r) might be 
(6.37) 
l2(r), 61(1), and 62(r) are similarly formulated with unknown coefficients a2j, Btj, B2j, 
respectively. 
If in the presence of lagged NF A, lagged CONT 1 make no significant explanation 
ofNFAt in equation (6.35), then we say, "CONTI does not cause NFA in the Granger 
sense." Similarly, if lagged NF A' s make no significant contribution to the explanation of 
CONTI in the presence oflagged CONTI' sin equation (6.360, then NFA "does not 
cause" CONTI. Thus ifl2(r) is zero, but 61 (r) is not, then NFA is causal. If both l2(r) 
and 61 (r) are zero, neither variable is causal, and if neither l2(r) nor 61 (r) is zero, 
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CONTI and NFA are mutually causal. No deep philosophical meanings are attached here 
to the word "causal." I simply distinguish the cases in which another variable's lags either 
do or do not make a net additional explanatory contribution once the dependent variable's 
own autocorrelation has been accounted for. 
6.7.1 Empirical Results 
Given this framework, with classical assumptions applied to the error terms, and 
with the sufficient data at hand, I used the approximate F statistic for the Granger 
causality test. To test for CONTI causation, I run a regression ofNFA on lagged NFA' s 
and lagged CONT I' s as the unconstrained regression, drop the lagged CONT I' s, 
regressing NF A only on the lagged NF A' s for the restricted regression, and compute the F 
statistic in the usual way. The regression errors,a.1 t and a.2t, if correlated, required the 
use of a method of estimation called "Seemingly Unrelated Regressions." 
6. 7 .2 Conclusions 
The results are very sensitive to the number of lags included and each variable 
( either NF A or CONT I) has a role in explaining the other. In USA, Indonesia, Mexico, 
and Kenya using just one lag the conclusion is that we fail to reject our null hypothesis 
that CONTI variables are not Granger caused by NF A, while CONTI variables do play a 
significant role in the explanation of the NF A! With three lags these conclusions are 
reversed, then from the fifth lag NF A plays a significant role in explaining CONTI 
variables. By observing the results from the sixth lag the powerful explanation of NF A 
decline gradually while CONTI variables roles get stronger until the 24th lag at which 
their significance gets equalized. 
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For Egypt the sensitivity to the number of lags is obvious too. Using just one lag. 
the conclusion is that each variable has a role to play in the determination of the other, 
while CONTI variable is a little bit powerful than.NF A. They equalized at lag ?th then 
the results are reversed after that, where NF A take the lead in terms of significance until 
the 24th lag. 
Thailand and United Arab Emirates the situation is different, although CONTI 
variables play a role in the determination of the NF A. NF A has a very significant role in 
the explanation of CONTI variables from the first lag to the 24th lag. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
There were several interesting findings in this study, especially for the monetary 
authorities in developing countries. The findings provide those authorities with a better 
understanding of the possibilities and preconditions for an appropriate use of the 
experiences gleaned from monetary policy experiences in developed economies in 
monetary planning, implementation of planned targets, and usage of monetary instruments 
for this purpose. It contributes to a better understanding of the need for ( 1) monetary 
policy methods of control over monetary base, (2) adjustments in monetary policy 
instruments, and (3) the appropriate structure of institutional changes. The findings are 
useful in cases of strong exogenous influences on monetary processes from deteriorating 
foreign markets and balance of payments intluericing the monetary process and economic 
developments especially in developing economies. 
Although the basic framework of analysis of the money supply is similar in all 
economies, the money supply process itself is highly differentiated depending on variety of 
factors, such as the openness of the economy. Each country maintains its balance of 
payments. Some of these Payments' systems have been under a fixed exchange rate, 
where their domestic currency pegged to only one other foreign currency, or to a basket 
of currencies. Since 1971 the world has moved to floating exchange rates. That leads to 
highly differentiated monetary base components in all economies, a phenomena that has 




Given the variety of institutional arrangements existing throughout the world, it is 
important to know that in many countries a central bank has sole responsibility for all 
monetary functions. In other cases some of these functions are either partially or entirely 
carried out by the central government and/or by other official institutions. In fulfilling its 
obligations as a lender of last resort, a central bank may encounter conflicts with its 
responsibility to manage the nation's monetary policy, especially, in LDC where the theory 
of monetary policy has not been fully explored. It is important to determine exactly either 
the components of the money or the monetary base or what money does, and to explain 
why this peculiar institution has arisen. With this in mind, Can the monetary authorities in 
less developed countries control the monetary base sufficiently, so that they can control 
their money stock growth? 
The Base 
The base may be regarded in either of two equivalent ways, the source base or the 
use base. The factors, from the assets and liabilities of the monetary authorities balance 
sheet, that make the base available are called "sources." Where the forms in which the 
base is held are referred to as "uses." 
The Source Base 
Utilizing the information in the two condensed balance sheets, central bank and 
demand deposit banks, and after abstracting the details, looking for the essence, I got a 
condensed balance sheet for the monetary system as a whole. From which, by netting the 
items appearing on the asset side of consolidated balance sheets of the monetary 
authorities and the commercial banks, a picture of relationships existing between the 
monetary sector as whole and the rest of the economy, a clear picture of how the money 
supply components formalized, and a formalization of the monetary base. 
The source base components can be netted as: 
1. Net Foreign Assets, that is foreign assets minus foreign liabilities minus long-term 
foreign borrowing, 
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2. Government Account, a discrepancy between claims on government and government 
deposits, 
3. Commercial Banks advances, that are claims on commercial banks, 
4. Public Sector advances, that is claims on public sector, and 
5. Other Sources. 
The Use Base 
The monetary base relates to components belong to its uses consists of things that 
function as reserves of the banking system and are obligations of the government or the 
central bank. Put another way, reserve requirements and currency. 
The components of the base in the seven different countries in the study: 
Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and United States 
show significant dispersion of the creation of monetary base in different economies. These 
differences usually were oversimplified to make a role applicabJe to many of the 
differentiated economic structures. The institutional economic system explains how and 
why the countries are different in either financial institutions or the size of their public 
sector that formalize the structure of either the economies system or the financial activities 
inside a country, and how these factors influence the components of the monetary base. 
For instances, it includes financial transactions, foreign transactions, income distribution, 
ownership of the means of production including capitalist or socialist economic system, 
and integration mechanism including free markets and/or central planning mechanism. 
The structure of monetary base could be influenced by the level of economic 
development. The needs for central bank transactions are greater in developing 
economies than developed economies. Central bank credits to other monetary institutions 
are relatively greater with less efficient financial markets in developing economies. Central 
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bank credits to other non-monetary institutions are more significant in developing 
economies. Greater sensitivity to deterioration of foreign markets in developing 
economies leads to a greater share of creation of monetary base by foreign transactions. 
The Controllabilitv of the Base 
A careful look at these components of the source base shows that the net foreign 
assets (NF A) reflects the position of a country's balance of payments, which is not under 
the control of the central bank. Variations of credit from a central bank to the government 
(GA), in some countries especially LDC, are also not under their central bank's control, 
because a central bank adjusts passively to the government's budget position. Thus, NF A 
and GA are essentially uncontrolled components, and the monetary authorities are left to 
the rest of the components, which is claims on commercial banks, claims on public sectors, 
and other sources, the controlled components, through which monetary authorities try to 
control the base. 
In the distinction between developed and developing countries, the main difference 
in the sources of the base-money is that in developed countries the major component of 
base money is claims on government (i.e., government securities), whereas in developing 
countries net foreign assets are the major component. In the United States, 70 percent of 
the supply of the base consists of federal reserve bank credit to the government in the form 
of US government securities. Therefore, in the US the money base is substantially under 
the control of Fed assuming some form of the Fed independence. In a small open 
economy foreign assets and foreign liabilities are significantly consist the sources of the 
monetary base, and play an important role in its behavior. This fact generates a major 
difference in the base structures between developed and developing economies. 
The relevant issue concerning the money supply control, then, is whether the 
foreign components of the monetary base can be offset by the actions of the central bank 
using domestic components. If a Central Bank is to maintain control of the monetary base 
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for pursuit of domestic goals, the impact of foreign reserves on the base-money must be 
sterilized by using sterilization policy instruments. 
Many LDCs are unable to influence the world price of any good. An increase in 
the money supply creates an excess demand for goods, services and assets. This excess 
demand is met by foreign suppliers (at the previously prevailing prices). The effect of the 
increase in the money supply is to create a balance of payments' deficit by the purchase of 
foreign goods and assets. 
If the balance of payments' deficit (surplus) exists, it creates a negative (positive) 
overseas impact on the money supply. The money supply is thus reduced (increased), and 
this continues until it reaches original level. In models like that, equilibrium in the money 
market is restored not by change in income as .in the quantity theory but, instead, by a 
balance of payments deficit (surplus). 
Summary of the Empirical Results 
The elements that have been laid out in the preceding discussion, of the theoretical 
mechanism of the monetary base in seven different countries, were subjected to empirical 
examination. The relevant issue is whether fluctuations in the uncontrolled components in 
the source base can be offset by the actions of central bank, so that the monetary 
authorities are able to provide a particular quantity of base money. The controllability of 
the monetary base depends primarily on the degree to which the movements of central 
bank credit are offset by opposite changes in the uncontrolled components. If movements 
of central bank credits are offset to a large degree, there may be little base control, 
otherwise it is controlled. 
The centerpiece of the difference is GA, If GA is considered as an uncontrolled 
component, it is added to the NF A generating the UN CONT variable, leaving CONT 
variable as the rest of the components. But, if GA treated as controlled component, the 
controlled variable become CONTI variable, leaving the NFA alone to be treated as the 
only uncontrolled variable. 
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It is generally recognized that estimation and testing of structural hypotheses using 
time series data must pay attention to the regression residuals. They may display 
systematic behavior that is inconsistent with the classical assumptions. In particular, it was 
recognized that the residuals from time series regressions are usually autocorrelated. 
Relying on classical regression methods when errors are serially correlated does not affect 
the unbiasedness or consistency of the estimators, but it does affect their efficiency. 
Stationarity requires the process to be in particular state of 'statistical equilibrium' 
which in tum implies that the mean and variance of any time series must be constant. In 
short, if a series has a finite mean, variance and covariances, i.e., all of which are 
independent of time, this series is defined as stationary. 
After the components of the base of the seven countries have been netted and left 
the base with either UNCONT and CONT, ·or NF A and CONTI, the attempt to 
investigate the stationarity of these components by applying Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
regression provides the existence of a unit root, and the components of the base in the 
sample countries are integrated of order one, 1(1). So we can tell that the variance goes to 
infinity as the time 't' goes to infinity, and the autocorrelation coefficient goes to 'I' as 't' 
goes to infinity, which invalidates the empirical work on the levels. 
Two or more variables are said to be cointegrated if individually each is 
nonstationary but there exists a linear combination of the variables that is stationary. In 
the attempt to find the appropriate linear combination of the series by estimating a 
cointegraring regression between the current values of the variables, and then test 
whether that linear combination is stationary by testing the residual from the regression, 
we fail to reject the hypothesis of non-cointegration, and the unit root exists in the 
disturbance term, i.e., the linear combination of the series is non-stationary, which will not 
validate any regression on the levels and imposes the investigation and the uses of the first 
difference. 
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In testing on the first difference, all the data series for the seven countries are 
stationary, which facilitates testing the relationships between the monetary base 
components in a typical country. So we can tell that, in regression analysis, the variance 
of a series is finite, and the autocorrelation's coefficient· decrease steadily in magnitude as 
time extended, so that their sum is finite. 
Model Estimates 
After refining the data base series, it was an interesting experiment to examine the 
controllability of the monetary base in the seven different countries, and to explore how 
the endogenous variables of the model, UN CONT or NF A, respond to a policy action 
imposed by a central bank using the controlled variables, CONT, or CONT 1. As far as 
control on the monetary base is concerned, NF A which is the reflection of the balance of · 
payments, can not generally be considered as a variable to be controlled. GA on the other 
hand, could be seen in two different fashions. First, uncontrolled variations that can not 
be used as an active instrument to adjust the base and usually adjusted passively to the 
government's budget position. Secondly, as a controlled variable that could be used as an 
effective instrument in controlling the monetary aggregate or to achieve an ultimate 
macroeconomic goals. 
When one month lagged differences or three months lagged differences are 
considered the empirical tests indicated that any movement in the controlled variables have 
an opposite changes in the uncontrolled variables with variety of the ability to offset 
between the countries. In this interval the time is too short for the uncontrolled 
components of the base to adjust to the changes in central bank credits, and to induce 
making a generalized conclusion. It worth to note here that in the three months lagged 
difference, the time is reasonably longer to show that the offsetting ability is higher for the 
uncontrolled components of the base to adjust to the changes in central bank credits. 
When twelve months lagged difference are considered, the results are dramatically 
high, using the corresponding domestic currency for each country, every one unit change 
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of that domestic currency in CONT variable will be more than offset by a very large 
opposite changes in UNCONT variable reaching 201.44 in United Arab Emirates and 
114.26 in Kenya. Where the ability to offset changes in CONTI movements by changes in 
(NF A) movements is also very big reached 209 percent in UAE and 97 .14 percent in 
Thailand. The explanatory power R 2 is very high. indicating that the very high ability to 
offset for those countries is explained well by the explanatory variables. In this interval, 
the time is long enough to show that the offsetting ability is higher for the uncontrolled 
components of the base to adjust to the changes in central bank credits. 
This finding presents evidence that every policy action to control the monetary 
base by changing central bank claims on domestic sector has been more than neutralized 
by opposite movements in net foreign assets only, or net foreign assets and government 
account. The long run effect is simply to change the composition of the source of the 
base. Even though the process is different, the results of this study support the idea of 
monetary approach to the balance of payments concerning the inability of the monetary 
authorities to control money supply in an open economy. 
More detection has been done to the behavior of NF A to see with more insight its 
offsetting powerful. Utilizing the series: Export, Import, and GNP in the seven countries 
under investigation in an annual bases from the IFS data, by adding Export plus Import 
and dividing the results by GNP for each country gave the results that roughly could 
represent how each country is open to the rest of the world, by measuring how much 
international trade it gets engaged in. The results supports the previous results in the 
sense that, the more open the economy, the less the controllability power of the country's 
central bank over their monetary base, and changes in monetary base, in tum, are linked to 
the positions of balance of payments and in some sense government budget. 
In an attempt to find ifNFA causes CONTI or if CONTI causes NFA, Granger 
Causality test has been !implemented. With the sufficient data at hand, I used the 
approximate F statistic to find whether or not lagged information on one variable has any 
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significant role in explaining the other. The results are very sensitive to the number of lags 
included, and each variable either NF A plus GA (UNCONT) or NF A only with the 
controlled variables, both have a significant role in explaining the other from the first lag 
to the 24th lag. 
Graphical display presented as an area of exploratory time series analysis to the 
relationships between variables under investigation, it shows how they move in opposite 
directions that made the controllability unattainable, this lead to better understanding of 
the relationships between the data at hand, the underlying economic theory, and the 
modeling techniques employed accompanied with its results. The charts supported the 
proceeding regression results. It confirm with the results and make it very clear that the 
long run effect of changing one of the controlled components of the source base will be 
ended up with changing in the composition of the source of the monetary base only. 
Analvtical structure 
A set of links relating to monetary base helps us to interpret certain recurring news 
items and also helps us to build the analytical structure used in the research. In a close 
economy, the monetary base is determined by the action of the central bank. In an open 
economy, the base is also affected by the position of the balance of payments. If the 
balance of payments deficit (surplus) exists, it creates a negative (positive) overseas 
impact on the monetary base. The monetary base is thus reduces (increased), and this 
continues until it reaches original level. The equilibrium in the money market, in model 
like that, is restored not by changes in income as in the quantity theory but, instead, by a 
balance of payments deficit( surplus). 
The influence of the balance of payments on the money supply occurs through two 
different channels: 
1. current account surplus or deficit, a surplus of current account of balance of payments 
leads to the creation of money and reserve money, and a current account deficit leads 
to a reduction of it. 
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2. the involvement of monetary institutions in foreign financial transactions in the balance 
of payments associated with the involvement of non-monetary units in these 
transactions. 
Studying the money market in an open economy allows us to trace the effects of a 
countries' monetary policies on its balance of payments. It is known that monetary policy 
will affect directly the domestic interest rate. The capital account of the balance of 
payments depends mainly on relative real interest rates (both home and abroad), a higher 
interest rate in our country will attract capital from abroad. This attraction will generate a 
balance-of-payments surplus, a money inflow, which is valid only in the short run. Over 
the longer run, this effect ceases or is even reversed. 
Autonomous expansion affects the balance of payments both through an income 
effect and through an interest rate effect. It is possible that an expansionary fiscal policy 
will actually improve the balance of payments. In the long run, though, the lending 
attracted with higher interest rates must be repaid with interest, canceling the international 
reserves gained from the initial inflow of borrowed money. So the net result is probably a 
worsening of the balance, though there would be a short-run improvement if enough 
lending were attracted by the higher interest rates. 
The effect of monetary and fiscal policy on the balance of payments are quite 
similar. With either policy, expanding the economy will result in a negative income effect 
on the balance of payments in the short run. The two policies differ mainly in their effects 
on interest rates, which are bid up by expansionary fiscal policy but bid down by 
expansionary monetary policy. This difference imparts only a temporary difference in 
balance-of-payments effects: if one attracts foreign funds and the other repels them, 
sooner or later these international lending flows will be repaid with interest. The more 
durable effect of either policy on the balance of payments is the income-related effect they 
have in common. 
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7 .2 Conclusions 
The increased interdependence of economies reflects the widespread foreign 
indebtedness of developing economies and their need to borrow from developed 
economies. The study provides better understanding between lenders and borrowers at 
different levels of economic development and with economic systems. A better 
understanding of economic climate in developing economies along with their financial 
organization may contribute to finding an optimal solution for economic policy. 
In developing economies there is a greater sensitivity to the deterioration in foreign 
markets, which results in deterioration of balance of payments and wider involvement by 
monetary institutions in foreign financing, as reflected in the withdrawal of money and 
reserve money by foreign exchange transactions by monetary institutions. This means that 
foreign exchanges' transactions in developing economies have a stronger influence on 
leakage of money and reserve money. For illustration, a sharp improvement in the 
balance-of-payments current account -- a surplus, instead of the traditional deficit in this 
account -- this will result in a creation -- instead of the traditional leakage -- of money and 
reserve money by foreign exchange transactions by monetary institutions in these 
economies. 
Economic theory considers the quantity of money and its rate of change an 
important determinant of how the economy functions. The study found that it is not the 
behavior of the monetary authorities alone that determines the quantity of money in the 
economy. The money supply process is, to some degree, influenced by the behavior of 
monetary authorities, commercial banks, the public, the foreign sector (balance of 
payments), and the government budget position. 
The money supply process in any economy is determined by changes in the 
monetary base, where changes in the source base, in tum, are linked to the positions of 
balance of payments, and government budget, so the main feature of this situation is that 
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the movements of the source components of the base are beyond full control of the 
-
monetary authorities. Since there is a close relationship between the-monetary base and 
money supply, difficulties face a central bank in any country to fully control the monetary 
base implies inability to control the money supply.· 
The analysis of the monetary base and other monetary process in the study 
contributes to the realization that some variables and relationships are neglected in existing 
monetary theories. The interpretation of some variables and ratios is oversimplified, 
assuming conditions existing only in a relatively small number of economies at the highest 
level of economic development, with the monetary and financial organization at the 
highest level of differentiation and efficiency. This may cause a readjustment of the 
existing equations aboutthe money supply that would include variables, ratios, and 
parameters reflecting the influence of the institutional economic system and economic 
development level. 
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